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Article
Implied Consent to Religious Institutions: A Primer 
and a Defense
MICHAEL A. HELFAND
One of the recent fault lines over religious liberty is the scope of protections 
afforded religiously motivated institutions and corporations. Courts and scholars 
all seem to agree that such religious institutions deserve some degree of protection. 
But there remains significant debate over the principles that should guide judicial 
decisions addressing the circumstances in which religiously motivated institutions 
should, and in which circumstances they should not, receive the law’s protection.
In this Article, I expound, and defend, my proposed “implied consent” 
framework for addressing religious institutional claims. Such a framework grounds 
the authority of religious institutions not in a degree of inherent religiosity, but in 
the presumed consent of their members. On such an account, consent can be 
assumed so long as members understood the unique religious objectives of the 
institution when they joined, thereby implicitly authorizing the institution to make 
rules and resolve disputes related to accomplishing these uniquely religious 
objectives. In this way, an implied consent framework focuses not on the objective 
religious quality and nature of religious institutions, but rather on the contextual 
indications of an implicitly consensual relationship between religious institutions 
and their members. In turn, an implied consent framework not only supports some 
of the religious liberty claims advanced by religious institutions, but also establishes 
important limits on religious institutional authority and autonomy.
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Implied Consent to Religious Institutions: A Primer 
and a Defense
MICHAEL A. HELFAND*
INTRODUCTION
How should we address conflicts between religiously motivated 
institutions and the law? Or, put differently, is there something special about 
religiously motivated institutions that should afford them unique protections 
from the law by virtue of their religious character? Answering these 
questions has increasingly become one of the central issues in navigating 
recent clashes between the aspirations of religion and the demands of the 
law. Indeed, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been asked to resolve a
variety of such claims, including a house of worship alleged to have 
impermissibly discriminated against a purportedly ministerial employee;1
for-profit and non-profit institutions which have refused to comply with 
regulations they believed violated their religious consciences;2 and for-profit 
businesses that refused, on account of their respective owner’s religious 
commitments, to provide services at same-sex weddings in violation of the 
state’s public-accommodations law.3
All told, in a range of situations—from for-profits to non-profits to, even 
more specifically, houses of worship—religiously motivated institutions 
have argued that the law provides them with special protections flowing 
from their uniquely religious status. Are these arguments correct? Does the 
law provide, in the words of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, “special solicitude” to religious institutions?4
The most accurate answer to the question is “sometimes.” There is a 
general consensus that religious institutions are entitled to some set of 
exemptions from the law’s demands. But courts and scholars continue to 
debate the contours of the doctrine. Should all religiously motivated 
                                                                                                                         
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of 
Law; Co-Director, Diane and Guilford Glazer Institute for Jewish Studies. The author would like to thank 
Alan Brownstein, Jessie Hill, Christopher Lund, and Elizabeth Sepper for their helpful and insightful 
comments on a previous draft of this article.
1 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 176–77 (2012).
2 See infra notes 14–17, 23–28 and accompanying text (summarizing case law on this issue).
3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Arlene's 
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
4 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189 (explaining that the First Amendment gives “special 
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”).
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institutions receive such exemptions? And from which laws should these 
religious institutions be exempted? Answering these questions has 
invariably required courts and scholars to provide a theory for why religious 
institutions are entitled to such exemptions—again, assuming they are at all.
In a series of articles, I have advanced an “implied consent” theory for 
providing religious institutions with some measure of exemptions from the 
law’s demands.5 Critics responded with concerns about the implication of 
such a theory.6 In this Article, my goal is therefore to summarize my theory 
of implied consent institutionalism, correct some misconceptions, and 
                                                                                                                         
5 See generally Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of 
Voluntarism, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (2015) [hereinafter Helfand, Religious Institutionalism]; Michael 
A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1891 (2013) 
[hereinafter Helfand, Church Autonomy]; Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493
(2013) [hereinafter Helfand, Litigating Religion]; Michael A. Helfand, What is a “Church”?: Implied 
Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2013) [hereinafter 
Helfand, What is a “Church”?].
6 For three of the most sustained critiques of the implied consent framework, see B. Jessie Hill, 
Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious Organizations, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 419, 421 (Chad Flanders, Zoe Robinson & Micah Schwartzman eds., 2016) 
(critiquing the premise of implied consent theory as seeing “voluntariness and exit as talismanic 
protections against overreaching by religious institutions”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery 
of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1265, 1299–1302 (2017) (arguing that implied consent theory is “flawed foundationally” due to, 
inter alia, its mischaracterization of the ecclesiastical employment relationship, its misreading of
Hosanna-Tabor, and its failure to establish a coherent methodology and application); Elizabeth Sepper, 
Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1471–74 (2015) (criticizing implied consent 
theorists, who “articulate . . . religious liberty claims by invoking Lochner’s central premises,” for 
framing exemption issues in contractual terms). In these critical responses, my work has often been 
grouped together with the excellent work of Christopher Lund and his article Free Exercise Reconceived: 
The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014). Lund, however, is a reluctant 
bearer of the implied consent label and his article somewhat eschews the principle as a useful category. 
See id. at 1200 (“Now maybe implied consent is not the best phrase for this; this is probably more 
analogous to assumption of risk. But of course it is true that implied consent is not consent, nor even a 
proxy for consent. Implied consent is a fiction used to operationalize the constitutional right of churches 
to have control over their own decisions.”).
For other, more limited, discussions of my implied consent framework, see Thomas C. Berg, Partly 
Acculturated Religious Activity: A Case for Accommodating Religious Nonprofits, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1341, 1370–71 (2016) (expressing sympathy for the framework, but proposing that the standards 
for an employer conveying its religious mission ought to be relaxed); Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate
Religious Liberty, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 277, 301–02 (2015) (arguing in reference to my proposal, 
among others, that “some of the more thoughtful corporate religious liberty supporters have 
acknowledged the importance of voluntariness, [but] [n]onetheless, they tend to be too quick to assume 
its presence”); Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 115–17 
(2016) (criticizing the implied consent framework because it opens the possibility of revoking that 
consent, which raises a number of practical and theoretical problems).
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respond to these criticisms.7 In a nutshell, an implied consent theory 
contends that religious institutions deserve protection because they are 
created through the voluntary choices of individuals to join together in the 
pursuit of collective religious objectives, such as faith and salvation. In so 
doing, these individuals implicitly authorize their religious institutions to 
make rules and develop doctrine that can promote these shared religious 
objectives. And in this way, an implied consent theory of religious 
institutionalism is grounded in a core commitment to the principle of 
voluntarism—that is, valuing the decisions of individual members of 
religious institutions when those decisions are the result of voluntary choices 
to join a religious collective in pursuit of shared religious objectives.
Importantly, the membership’s grant of authority to a religious 
institution is conveyed implicitly—it is inferred from the very act of joining 
an institution that is openly and obviously seeking to pursue religious 
objectives collectively.8 Thus, the Supreme Court has referred to this form 
of consent as “implied consent,” and it empowers the religious institution to 
promulgate rules that promote shared religious values.9 In this way, the 
creation of a religious institution represents the voluntary free exercise of 
religion on the part of many individuals, each granting a religious institution 
authority over internal religious life among the membership in order to 
promote shared religious objectives.
Grounding the authority of religious institutions in the implied consent 
of its membership has a wide range of implications for the law, some of 
which are detailed below. For example, it provides guidance as to which 
institutions should be entitled to some degree of protection from the law. It 
also provides guidelines for when religious institutions should be stripped of 
those protections. My implied consent theory of religious institutionalism 
has also been subject to some criticism to which I provide some responses 
below.10 The theory, to be sure, is far from perfect. But it provides a 
workable framework that both explains why religious institutions should be 
shielded at times from legal liability and makes sure that those protections 
do not run roughshod over other core values embodied in the law.
                                                                                                                         
7 This Article therefore incorporates significant portions of my previous work, see supra note 5,
updating that work in order to respond to legal developments as well as criticism of the implied consent 
framework.
8 It is worth noting that in this way, implied or tacit consent is different from hypothetical consent. 
For a useful discussion, see A. John Simmons, Tacit Consent and Political Obligation, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 274, 282 (1976).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part III.
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I. ARE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS DIFFERENT?
The answer is, as noted above, sometimes. To appreciate the breadth of 
these tensions, consider some of the recent examples of conflict between the 
commitments of religiously motivated institutions and the requirements of 
the law. In a 2012 case, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the “ministerial exception,” which exempts religious 
institutions from complying with various antidiscrimination statutes in the 
hiring and firing of “ministers.”11 In affirming the ministerial exception, the 
Court unanimously held that the First Amendment grants “special solicitude 
to the rights of religious organizations.”12 Thus, the defendant—a
church-operated primary school—could not be held liable under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act for terminating the plaintiff—a
fourth-grade teacher—because she was a “called” minister.13
Other cases of conflict stem from religious liberty claims advanced by 
religiously motivated for-profit organizations. For example, for-profit 
employers made such claims in the litigation over the Affordable Care Act’s 
contraception mandate, which requires employers who provide health 
insurance to also cover FDA-approved contraceptives or face significant 
financial penalties.14 A wide range of religiously motivated for-profit 
institutions brought suit against the mandate, arguing that providing 
employees with insurance coverage for contraception made them complicit 
in conduct they believe to be sinful—therefore, complying with the mandate 
required them to violate their religious consciences.15 Because religious 
for-profit institutions were not exempted from the mandate, these 
institutions asserted religious liberty claims pursuant to the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act16—claims that were ultimately vindicated by the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, albeit on 
somewhat limited grounds.17
                                                                                                                         
11 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 180–81 (2012).
12 Id. at 189.
13 Id. at 178, 190.
14 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). But see Marty Lederman, 
Hobby Lobby Part III—There is No “Employer Mandate”, BALKINAZATION (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-employer.html [https://perma.cc/
GR85-JVD7] (arguing that employers are not mandated to provide contraception and have other 
alternatives such as not providing an employee healthcare plan).
15 For a list of cases brought against the contraception mandate, see HHS Case Database, BECKET,
http://www.becketlaw.org/research-central/hhs-info-central/hhs-case-database/ [https://perma.cc/V9T2-
ZAEM] (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
16 E.g., Ass’n of Christian Schs. Int’l v. Burwell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1286 (D. Colo. 2014).
17 See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2759 (“[T]he regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, 
which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise 
of religion unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government 
interest.”).
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In a similar vein, religiously motivated for-profit institutions clashed 
with prevailing antidiscrimination laws in a series of cases where vendors—
including a baker, a florist, and a photographer—have refused to provide 
their services at same-sex weddings and commitment ceremonies.18 In those 
cases, the vendors argued that, as religiously motivated institutions, their 
right to religious liberty was being abridged by the prevailing 
public-accommodations laws—laws that prohibited them, as commercial 
enterprises, from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation in the 
provision of services—notwithstanding the fact they believed that providing 
services at a same-sex ceremony violated their religious consciences.19 In 
each case, state courts found the vendors liable, ultimately determining that 
the religious liberty protections afforded these religiously motivated 
institutions were insufficient to shield them from liability under the relevant 
public accommodations law.20 The Supreme Court overturned two such state 
court decisions on narrow grounds,21 likely ensuring that debates over such 
clashes persist going forward.22
And finally, institutions falling between houses of worship and for-profit 
institutions—various non-profit entities—have also tangled with the law. 
The most recent big-ticket example of this phenomenon again stems from 
the contraception mandate litigation, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Zubik v. Burwell.23 In Zubik, religiously motivated non-profit 
employers—including hospitals, charities, and universities—challenged the 
contraception mandate.24 These non-profits had been exempted from the 
mandate,25 but they argued that the process for securing the accommodation, 
which requires some non-profits to self-certify as religious institutions, 
violated their religious liberty rights. The argument: filing the paperwork 
                                                                                                                         
18 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (holding 
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (CCRC) violated the Free Exercise Clause when it ruled that 
the baker violated a state antidiscrimination act because the CCRC’s treatment of the baker’s case 
displayed prohibited hostility towards his religious beliefs); Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 
S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (granting the petition for certiorari, vacating the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion 
denying the florist’s Free Exercise claims and remanding for further consideration in light of Masterpiece 
Cakeshop); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1787 (2014) (rejecting RFRA defense in a case dealing with a photographer).
19 See id.
20 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 276 (Colo. App. 2015) (baker); Washington 
v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548 (Wash. 2017) (florist); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 
309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
21 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Arlene's 
Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).  
22 Indeed, litigation over the conduct and policies of the Masterpiece Cakeshop persists.  See 
Complaint, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Elenis (D. Colo. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-02074), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/MasterpieceCakeshopComplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQY6-JENP]. 
23 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
24 Id. at 1559. 
25 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
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that confirms they are religious institutions, and thereby secures their 
religious exemption, triggers contraceptive insurance coverage for their 
employees.26 And, in turn, triggering such coverage—even if paid for and 
provided by a third party and not the objecting institution—makes them 
complicit in conduct they believe to be sinful. Although this argument was 
rejected by nearly all the federal courts of appeals,27 the Supreme Court 
chose to vacate the non-profit cases and remand them to the federal courts 
of appeals, postponing resolution of these non-profit institutional claims.28
All such cases have pressed courts to determine when institutions—from 
for-profit business to conventional houses of worship—should be shielded 
from legal requirements on account of the institution’s religious 
commitments. And in all of them, courts have struggled somewhat to 
provide a framework to analyze these questions. 
Contemporary questions surrounding the legal treatment of religious 
institutions start, in many ways, from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith.29 In Smith, the Court did not address the 
claims of a religious institution. Instead, it addressed the claims of two 
individuals—Al Smith and Galen Black—who had been terminated from 
their employment for ingesting peyote.30 When Smith and Black attempted 
to collect their unemployment benefits, they were informed that they were 
not eligible because they had been terminated for cause.31 Smith and Black, 
however, countered that they had ingested peyote as part of a sacramental 
Native American ceremony—therefore, denying their request for 
unemployment benefits violated their rights under the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause.32
In ruling against the plaintiffs, the Court held that they were not entitled 
to a constitutionally mandated religious exemption.33 In so doing, the Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause only protects against laws that target or 
                                                                                                                         
26 For an up-to-date list of cases filed by non-profits over the self-certification process, see HHS 
Case Database, supra note 15.
27 Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 442 (3d Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 613–16 (7th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016); Priests for Life v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 
237 (D.C. Cir. 2014), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Mich. Catholic Conference & Catholic Family 
Servs. v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 388–90 (6th Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1914 (2015). But see Sharpe 
Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2015) (reaching 
the opposite result and finding in favor of the religiously motivated non-profit), vacated, 2016 WL 
2842448 (U.S. May 16, 2016).
28 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1561 (2016).
29 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
30 Id. at 874.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 882.
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discriminate against religion.34 By contrast, the Free Exercise Clause does 
not provide any protection against laws that are facially neutral and 
“generally applicable”—that is, those that have legitimate secular objectives 
and only incidentally burden religion.35
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause 
represented somewhat of a departure from precedent. While the Court’s free 
exercise precedent had been doctrinally uneven, the Court’s overall 
framework prior to Smith afforded far broader religious liberty protections.36
Under prior decisions, the Free Exercise Clause required courts to grant 
exemptions from laws that substantially burdened religiously motivated 
conduct, unless applying the law was necessary to achieve a compelling 
government interest.37 The Court’s new jurisprudence discarded this 
substantial-burden framework, only providing constitutional protection 
against laws that targeted religiously motivated conduct.38
The Court’s holding in Smith raised the following question for religious 
institutions: Would they also only be afforded exemptions from laws where 
those laws were not facially neutral and generally applicable? Or would the 
law provide religious institutions some measure of protection beyond the 
protections afforded individuals? The question was complicated by 
significant precedent indicating that religious institutions were entitled to 
some degree of autonomy,39 allowing them to arrange their own internal 
affairs in a manner that did not conform to various legal obligations.40
As an example of this autonomy, consider the long-standing “ministerial 
exception,”41 which exempts religious institutions from complying with 
                                                                                                                         
34 Id.
35 Id. at 885–86. 
36 See Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 556–63 (discussing the tensions and 
ambiguities that have plagued free exercise doctrine). 
37 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (“[E]xposing Amish children to worldly 
influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and . . . substantially interfering 
with the religious development of the Amish child . . . contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice 
of the Amish faith . . . .”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (requiring a compelling state 
interest to justify infringement on the Free Exercise Clause). Again, as noted above, Supreme Court 
decisions were not wholly consistent on this issue, especially in the decade prior to the Smith decision.
38 See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Wish Granting and the Property Rights Genie, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 7, 45 (1996) (explaining how the Court’s framework changed in this circumstance).
39 Even Smith contained such language, though it was ambiguous. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (“And 
it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be 
reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns.”).
40 Maybe the most prominent precedent is the Supreme Court’s statement in Kedroff that articulates 
“a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation,” 
which, according to the Court, entailed a “power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, 
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral 
of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
41 See generally Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring 
the Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 43 (2008) (explaining the logic and application of the ministerial exception).
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various employment statutes in the hiring and firing of “ministers.”42 The 
ministerial exception was first announced by the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in McClure v. Salvation Army,43 in which the court found:
[T]hat the application of the provisions of Title VII to the 
employment relationship existing between The Salvation 
Army and Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister would 
result in an encroachment by the State into an area of religious 
freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the principles of the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment.44
In this way, the ministerial exception represented a central piece of a 
broader principle that government interference in the internal workings of 
religious institutions represented, at least in some circumstances, a violation 
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has previously framed this principle as follows: “Freedom to select the 
clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must 
now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free 
exercise of religion against state interference.”45 Accordingly, prior to 1990, 
other jurisdictions typically followed the Fifth Circuit’s lead of McClure,46
tracing the ministerial exception to the demands of the Free Exercise Clause, 
which required courts to afford some degree to autonomy to religious 
institutions.47
But what to make of the ministerial exception—and, more broadly, 
claims of religious institutional autonomy—in the wake of Smith? If the Free 
Exercise Clause only affords exceptions from laws that target religion, then 
what justification could there be for religious institutional autonomy claims 
based upon the Free Exercise Clause? Surely the types of claims at stake in 
many ministerial exception cases—such as Title VII and the American with 
Disabilities Act—do not target religion. If so, why should a religious 
institutional-autonomy doctrine grounded in the Free Exercise Clause 
                                                                                                                         
42 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) 
(defining and applying the ministerial exception).
43 Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons of Smith, 
2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1651 (“Beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. Salvation 
Army, lower federal courts have uniformly carved out what has become known as the ‘ministerial 
exception’ to employment discrimination statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
44 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
45 Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
46 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the 
existence of a ‘ministerial exception’ . . . .”).
47 See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (examining the ministerial exception in the context of the Free Exercise Clause and 
noting that it was unnecessary to discuss the potential applicability of the Establishment Clause); Rayburn 
v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985) (characterizing the 
ministerial exception as primarily a free exercise doctrine); McClure, 460 F.2d at 560 (linking the 
ministerial exception to the Free Exercise Clause).
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provide any protection against such claims beyond the protections afforded 
by Smith?48
Some critics of religious institutional autonomy took this argument to 
its logical conclusion, contending that, in the wake of Smith, religious 
institutions—like religious individuals—ought to only receive the Free 
Exercise Clause’s protections when a law targets some sort of religious 
practice.49 Absent such a finding, religious institutions should receive the 
same, and only the same, protections that are afforded other institutions 
under the rubric of the First Amendment’s freedom of association.
Indeed, this precise argument was presented to the Supreme Court in the 
2012 case, Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, in which Cheryl Perich, a fourth-grade 
teacher at a church-operated school, claimed that her employer violated her 
rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act.50 The employer, however, 
claimed that it was shielded from liability by the ministerial exception 
because Perich was a “called teacher.”51 Perich and the EEOC, in pressing 
the case, argued that whatever protections were afforded religious 
institutions by the First Amendment stemmed from the implicit freedom of 
association and not the religion clauses.52 Thus, as characterized by the 
Court, “[t]he EEOC and Perich . . . see no need—and no basis—for a 
special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves.”53
The Court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected Perich’s claims and 
specifically attacked this argument:
We find this position untenable. . . . It follows under the 
EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First Amendment analysis 
should be the same, whether the association in question is the 
Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club . . . . That 
result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                         
48 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial 
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 2004–05 (2007) (describing the 
weakness of a doctrine based in the Free Exercise Clause when compared to one based in the 
Establishment Clause); Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1099, 1194–95 (“In those jurisdictions that recognize the ministerial exception, 
it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future, but it is in tension with the Court's most recent cases 
clarifying the Free Exercise Clause.”).
49 Hamilton, supra note 46, at 1195.
50 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
51 See id. at 177 (differentiating “‘called’ teachers”—teachers “called to their vocation by God 
through a congregation”—from “‘contract’ teachers”—teachers “appointed by the school board without 
a vote of the congregation”).
52 See Oral Argument at 37:22, Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (No. 10-553), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-553 [https://perma.cc/S73K-T7W7] (“We don’t see that line of 
church autonomy principles in the Religion Clause jurisprudence as such. We see it as a question of 
freedom of association.”). 
53 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189.
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itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations.54
But this reference to the “special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations” presented a bit of a puzzle.55 Smith appeared to discard any 
notion that the Free Exercise Clause provided any special protections for 
religiously motivated conduct; it only provided protection against the 
targeting of religious conduct.56 How could you square Hosanna-Tabor with 
Smith?
The Court tried its hand at answering the question, arguing as follows:
It is true that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation, like 
Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law 
of general applicability. But a church’s selection of its 
ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote. Smith
involved government regulation of only outward physical acts. 
The present case, in contrast, concerns government 
interference with an internal church decision that affects the 
faith and mission of the church itself. The contention that 
Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted 
in the Religion Clauses has no merit.57
Not surprisingly, commentators puzzled over the Court’s distinction 
between “outward physical acts” in Smith and the “internal” acts supposedly 
at stake in Hosanna-Tabor. Was termination of an employee not also an 
outward physical act?58 The Court’s distinction seemed to be deeply 
unsatisfying, leaving the central question unanswered: Why should religious 
institutions be afforded special constitutional protections under the religion 
clauses?
One response was to distinguish between free exercise claims brought
by individuals and free exercise claims brought by religious institutions.59
For example, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals avoided the challenges of 
                                                                                                                         
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888–90 (1990).
57 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (citation omitted).
58 See, e.g., Michael Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:30 
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote.html [https://perma.cc/5YBB-775Q]
(responding to the Supreme Court’s attempt in Hosanna-Tabor to distinguish Smith by querying, “With 
due respect: huh???”); Jeffrey Pasek, Ministerial Exemption is Shrouded in Uncertainty, JURIST (Jan. 21, 
2012, 12:00 PM), http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/jeffrey-pasek-ministerial-ada.php [https://perma.cc/
L8GU-BGPZ] (“The internal-external distinction is new and hardly self-explanatory. However, 
the Hosanna-Tabor opinion said little to illuminate or defend it.”).
59 See Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 306 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The Free Exercise Clause 
protects not only the individual’s ‘right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires,’ 
but also a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.” 
(citations omitted)).
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Smith when it came to the ministerial exception by holding that “the burden 
on free exercise that is addressed by the ministerial exception is of a 
fundamentally different character from that at issue in Smith” because “[t]he 
ministerial exception is not invoked to protect the freedom of an individual 
to observe a particular command or practice of his church. Rather, it is 
designed to protect the freedom of the church to select those who will carry 
out its religious mission.”60 Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
noted that, notwithstanding Smith, the Free Exercise Clause still protected 
“a religious institution’s right to decide matters of faith, doctrine, and church 
governance.”61
This notion that the Free Exercise protections afforded religious 
institutions (like in Hosanna-Tabor) were fundamentally different than the 
Free Exercise protections afforded individuals (like in Smith) linked to the 
growing body of scholarship supporting the “church autonomy doctrine,” 
which provided religious institutions with sovereignty over their own 
internal affairs free from government interference.62 On such an account, the 
religion clauses instructed courts not to encroach on the jurisdiction of 
religious institutions. Proponents of this sovereignty approach63 emphasized 
the important values promoted by a jurisdictional approach to the authority 
                                                                                                                         
60 EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
61 Petruska, 462 F.3d at 306 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
62 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the 
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 175 (2011) (“The ‘ministerial exception,’ at 
issue in Hosanna-Tabor, is a clear and crucial implication of religious liberty, church autonomy, and the 
separation of church and state—principles embodied in both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
of the First Amendment.”); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Organizational Freedom and Conditions on 
Government Benefits, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165, 167 (2009) (arguing that protection for internal 
decisions could be supported by both the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses); Richard W. 
Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL.
L. REV. 273, 288 (2008) (explaining that churches’ ability to control their internal procedures is not based 
on a special status, but instead is based on constitutional values); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First 
Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 79, 81 (2009) 
[hereinafter Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions] (describing the “church autonomy” doctrine as an 
“increasingly important site of contestation in the law of the Religion Clauses”); Paul Horwitz, Act III of 
the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 156, 161 (2011) (analogizing the church and 
state to two separate sovereigns) [hereinafter Horwitz, Act III]; Kalscheur, supra note 39, at 48–49 (2008) 
(discussing how the ministerial exception has been “invoked to protect religious institutions from the 
requirements of antidiscrimination law in the ministerial employment context”); see also Mark DeWolfe 
Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term—Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 91, 94 (1954) (examining the “preference” for churches and how “the Court may have been 
persuaded that a church must enjoy prerogatives of sovereignty which are not to be conceded to other 
social groups”).
63 See, e.g., Horwitz, Act III, supra note 60, at 161–62 (2011) (“[C]ourts, and the state itself, are 
simply not authorized to intervene in life at the heart of churches. At a deep level, these questions lie 
beyond the reach of the state altogether. The two kingdoms of temporal and spiritual authority, of church 
and state, constitute two separate sovereigns.”).
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and autonomy of religious institutions: the limited authority of the state64
and the free development of religious life.65 By granting religious 
institutions with sole authority over matters of religious doctrine, discipline,
and governance, the state recognizes the independent autonomy of religious 
institutions and provides those institutions with the space to control those 
core religious matters. And in this way—and for these reasons—religious 
institutions ought to draw broader protections from the religion clauses than 
do religiously motivated individuals.
A sovereigntist approach to religious institutions was only one theory 
for explaining the legal and constitutional status of religious institutions.
Other courts and scholars have embraced a hands-off approach that does not 
assign any unique legal status to religious institutions.66 Instead, the reason 
religious institutions are granted a sphere of autonomy free from government 
interference is simply to ensure that government does not become 
impermissibly entangled in religious matters.67 Maybe the most 
representative and explicit judicial statement of this view comes from the 
Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Schleicher v. Salvation Army:
The purpose of the doctrine is not to benefit marginal religions 
that, lacking the political muscle to obtain legislative 
protections of their rituals and observances, turn to the courts 
instead; it is to avoid judicial involvement in religious matters, 
such as claims of discrimination that if vindicated would limit 
a church’s ability to determine who shall be its ministers.68
Such approaches keep courts out of the internal business of religious 
institutions, not because such institutions are deserving of some sort of 
constitutionally mandated autonomy; it is simply to ensure that courts do not 
become embroiled in resolving religious questions in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. Indeed, picking up on this approach, many courts 
have, subsequent to Smith, increasingly emphasized that church autonomy 
                                                                                                                         
64 See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental 
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 67 (1998) (“[R]eligions that point to a transcendent authority help check the 
power of the modern nation-state. This is because such religions refuse to recognize the state's 
sovereignty as absolute.”); Kalscheur, supra note 39, at 43 (describing how conceptualizing the 
ministerial exception as jurisdictional reaffirms the “penultimacy of the state”).
65 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 64, at 63 (“Rather, the aim of the Clause is for government to avoid 
activities that harm the integrity of religion (religare) or religious organizations (the ekklesia).”);
Horwitz, supra note 62, at 114 (concluding that “[u]nder a sphere sovereignty approach to religious 
entities,” religious institutions “would coexist alongside the state . . . serving a vital role in furthering 
self-fulfillment, the development of a religious community, and the development of public discourse”).
66 For an explanation of the “hands-off” doctrine, see Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court 
Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (explaining that 
the hands-off approach requires the government to “keep out of internal problems of religious bodies 
when those problems concern religious understandings”).
67 See infra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
68 Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 2008).
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doctrines, such as the ministerial exception, are grounded not in the Free 
Exercise Clause, but in the Establishment Clause and its subsidiary 
requirement that government not become entangled in religious matters.69
The two most prominent scholarly exponents of this view—Ira Lupu 
and Robert Tuttle—have pressed the consequences of this perspective, 
forcefully arguing over the course of a number of years against the view that 
“religious institutions are presumptively autonomous.”70 On their account, 
courts are constitutionally prohibited from adjudicating religious claims, but 
not because of some constitutional desire to “systematically protect the 
interests of certain classes of parties, defined by religious mission.”71
Instead, the Establishment Clause imposes a bar on judicial resolution of 
religious claims because such “claims would require courts to answer 
questions that the state is not competent to address.”72 Thus, as one scholar 
has summarized this approach,
[i]n contrast to ordinary questions of fact, religious questions 
are understood to lie beyond judicial competence because they 
do not depend on the logic of law. Instead, religious questions 
may be answered on the basis of faith, mystical experiences, 
miracles, or other nonrational sources.73
Accordingly, courts cannot interfere in such matters on a theory of 
“adjudicative disability”—the state simply has “limited jurisprudential 
competence” to decide such religious matters.74 From this standpoint, to 
intervene in a religious institution’s internal affairs—and lend the authority 
of the state to one side or the other of a dispute—would be tantamount to 
                                                                                                                         
69 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208–09 (2d Cir. 2008) (using the Establishment 
Clause to hold the application of Title VII to a decision made by a religious institution unconstitutional); 
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The exception is based on 
the establishment and free-exercise clauses of the First Amendment . . . .” (citations omitted)); Gellington 
v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e find that the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a church from being sued 
under Title VII by its clergy.”); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (“The Establishment Clause serves as a separate constitutional basis for the ministerial 
exception to Title VII.”); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (using an analysis based on the Establishment Clause as a basis for refusal to review a dispute
involving a religious matter). 
70 Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional 
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 78–79 (2002).
71 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious 
Institutions and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 122 (2007).
72 Id. at 138; see also Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1815 (2004) (elaborating on the implications of the Establishment 
Clause in this context).
73 Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine 
Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497, 536 (2005). On the nonrational character of 
religious claims, see Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion?, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 18 (2008).
74 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 71, at 122–23.
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government “establishing” a religion.75 As a result, the protections afforded 
to religious institutions are not grounded in some notion of inherent 
autonomy; these legal protections are simply a byproduct of the fact that 
courts lack the jurisdictional authority to intervene in the internal affairs of 
religious institutions.76 The church autonomy doctrine is thus best viewed as 
shorthand for the “adjudicative disability” of courts—that is, the fact that 
courts cannot resolve disputes within religious institutions because they lack 
the competence to resolve disputes that implicate religious doctrine or 
practice.77 Applied to the ministerial exception, Lupu and Tuttle have 
explained the ramifications of their theory as follows:
[R]ecognizing the ministerial exception serves the 
prophylactic function of fully recognizing the adjudicative 
disability of courts with respect to fitness for ministry, and 
thereby protecting religious communities from both 
inappropriate intrusion and the risk of erroneous 
determinations.78
Both the sovereignty and the adjudicative-disability approaches to the 
unique legal standing of religious institutions, however, are problematic in 
that they fail to provide adequate limitations on the authority of religious 
institutions. Criticism of the sovereignty approach for lacking meaningful 
limits to the authority of religious institutions has been a recurring theme in 
recent academic literature. Maybe the most forceful critique of religious 
institutionalism, a 2013 article by Richard Schragger and Micah 
Schwartzman titled Against Religious Institutionalism, presented the 
problem of limits as follows: 
The strong form of sphere sovereignty claims that churches 
have a special, unique, and exclusive mission to preach the 
Word, to convert the unconverted, and to glorify God. This is 
the nature of the jurisdictional claim at its heart, and stated in 
its baldest form, it seems to countenance very few limits on 
church immunity. The stakes are too high.79
                                                                                                                         
75 Cf. id. at 137 (“Marking out regulatory zones from which government is excluded constitutes a 
central element in a strategy of ensuring the anti-totalitarian quality of governance.”). 
76 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 64, at 45–46 (discussing the underpinnings of the courts’ lack of 
jurisdiction over the internal matters of churches); Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions, supra note 62,
at 120–22 (advocating for broad institutional immunity for churches in employment decisions); 
Kalscheur, supra note 41, at 48–49 (addressing the ministerial exemption and its widespread adoption 
among courts).
77 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 71, at 122; see also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 72, at 1815 (explaining 
that ministerial immunities arise from jurisdictional limitations).
78 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1283.
79 Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV.
917, 946 (2013).
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More recently, Lupu and Tuttle have launched a similar criticism:
[T]he notion that any private entities should be afforded 
sweeping authority, free of state supervision, over persons and 
their property is thoroughly inconsistent with liberal 
democratic order . . . . Our constitutional arrangements do not 
permit the delegation of coercive and unreviewable authority 
to families or other private associations, whether these 
associations are religious or not.80
To the extent the sovereignty approach to religious institutions derives 
the authority of such institutions from an inherent sovereignty that stands 
beyond the authority of the state, it is difficult to see what legal principles 
could be marshaled to articulate limits on religious institutional authority.
And given that there are some claims where we might surely expect some 
legal limits on the authority of religious institutions,81 a sovereignty 
approach seems to prove too much to serve as a viable framework.
Ironically, the claims of adjudicative disability suffer from a somewhat 
similar problem.82 As noted above, theories of adjudicative disability seek 
to limit religious institutional claims by rejecting the notion that such 
institutions have any inherent autonomy. Instead, courts can regulate 
religious institutions, so long as such regulation relates to resolving claims 
that do not require interrogating of religious doctrine or religious 
standards.83 To do otherwise—to resolve claims that implicate religious 
questions—would ostensibly violate the Establishment Clause by leading 
courts to become impermissibly entangled with religion.84
The challenge, however, is that refusing to interrogate claims that 
implicate religious standards creates a legal space where government cannot 
adequately protect the interests of citizens from serious harms. Consider 
again the foremost proponents of this view: Lupu and Tuttle. In maybe the 
most thorough consideration of institutional autonomy and sexual 
misconduct, Lupu and Tuttle explore how their theory of adjudicative 
                                                                                                                         
80 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1298.
81 See Michael A. Helfand, How to Limit Accommodations: Wrong Answers and Rights Answers, 4 
J.L. RELIGION & STATE 1, 4 (2016) (discussing, and criticizing, the attempted use of RFRA as a defense 
to physical violence by a group of rabbis seeking to force husbands to grant their wives religious 
divorces); infra note 97 (discussing claims related to sexual misconduct by religious leaders).
82 I say “ironically” because this is the precise criticism Lupu and Tuttle level against those 
promoting a sovereignty approach to religious institutions as well as those adopting an implied consent 
framework. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1302 (claiming that proponents of sovereignty or implied
consent theories “persistent[ly] fail[] to analyze situations that seem difficult, or to identify any cases in 
which religious entities should lose”).
83 See supra notes 64–75 (providing numerous assertions of this position).
84 I have elsewhere contested this interpretation of the Establishment Clause. E.g., Helfand, 
Litigating Religion, supra note 5, at 497 (arguing that courts should not interpret the Establishment Clause 
to categorically prevent them from litigating on religious issues).
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disability might map on to claims of clergy sexual misconduct.85 In 
explaining how, in their view, institutional autonomy is not a right granted 
religious institutions, but a function of the limitation on judicial intervention 
in religious disputes, they note:
Ecclesiastical immunities . . . are not the offspring of rights in 
the conventional sense. They are not the legal entitlements of 
religious entities in the way that, for example, authors and 
political advocates possess rights to communicate. Instead, 
ecclesiastical immunities are the entailments of the 
jurisdictional limitations that the Establishment Clause 
imposes upon the state’s role. Because the state is forbidden 
from being the author or coauthor of religious faith, it may not 
adjudicate or regulate the ways in which communities of faith 
are organized. Nor may the state select the voices which lead 
these communities, nor the lessons they communicate.86
Lupu and Tuttle go on to carefully parse various different scenarios in 
which individuals and institutions might seek refuge from liability for 
conduct related to sexual misconduct—and to what extent the Establishment 
Clause provides that refuge.87
The problem is that, in linking liability to avoidance of Establishment 
Clause prohibitions, Lupu and Tuttle’s theory does not allow courts to take
into account the interests at stake in any given case that counterbalance the 
religious institutional claims. Thus, for example, Lupu and Tuttle argue that 
many claims that allege a religious institution breached its fiduciary duty to 
one of its members—for example, where a house of worship failed to take 
the necessary steps or precautions in order to prevent a religious leader from 
engaging in sexual misconduct—are constitutionally off limits.88 The 
reason: “[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a state from using the civil law 
to impose a normative vision of the structure of religious organizations.”89
Therefore, many civil suits against religious institutions for failing to 
properly respond to the sexual misconduct of employees cannot be 
adjudicated by courts because those suits either assume certain 
organizational relationships or impose certain supervisory responsibilities;
and for a court to assuming such relationships or impose such 
responsibilities would amount to the state taking a position regarding the 
                                                                                                                         
85 Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 72, at 1797–98, 1801.
86 Id. at 1815.
87 See id. at 1891–92 (examining the relationship between priest-penitent privilege and 
Establishment Clause analyses).
88 See id. at 1836, 1838 (arguing that judicial expansion of a religious institution’s fiduciary duty 
“is in serious tension with . . . First Amendment considerations”).
89 Id. at 1844.
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appropriate internal functioning of a religious institution, which Lupu and 
Tuttle see as constitutionally prohibited. Or, in their own words: 
Because such duties of loyalty to all adherents of the faith 
effectively dictate the mechanisms of control over clergy, and 
effectively compel a particular organizational response to 
victims of clergy misbehavior, imposing these duties tends to 
unconstitutionally establish a legally preferred structure of 
denominational life.90
Importantly, this assessment remains true regardless of how damaging 
the sexual misconduct at stake: according to a theory of adjudicative 
disability, the Establishment Clause prohibits certain kinds of religious 
inquiries into the theology and traditions that animate employment 
relationships within a religious organization. For this reason, using the 
Establishment Clause to define the protections afforded religious institutions 
is heavy medicine. Consider the following: claims asserted pursuant to the 
Free Exercise Clause are subjected to strict scrutiny; as a result, Free 
Exercise claims can be trumped where doing so is the least-restrictive means 
for advancing a compelling government interest.91 In this way, courts have 
a safeguard to protect compelling government interests when addressing 
religious liberty claims grounded in the Free Exercise Clause.92
By contrast, grounding the claims of religious institutions in the 
Establishment Clause prevent courts from taking any relevant compelling 
government interests into account.93 This is because the Establishment 
Clause is a structural constraint on government power, imposing 
jurisdictional limitations on the authority of the state to intervene.94 Thus,
courts—to the extent they adopt an adjudicative disability theory and adopt 
an Establishment Clause gloss on the protections afforded religious 
institutions—lack the jurisdiction to intervene in such disputes, missing any 
                                                                                                                         
90 Id. at 1845.
91 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (“We must next consider whether some 
compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's [free exercise rights].”).
92 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (explaining that a school cannot compel 
attendance beyond a certain grade if it “interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief” and 
there is not “a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the 
Free Exercise Clause”).
93 See Lupu & Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 72, at 1815–16
(“Because the state is forbidden from being the author or coauthor of religious faith, it may not adjudicate 
or regulate the ways in which communities of faith are organized . . . . Religious entities cannot waive 
this jurisdictional limitation, which we believe resides most comfortably in the Establishment Clause 
. . . . Moreover, no state assertion of countervailing state interests, compelling or otherwise, may operate 
to set aside this limitation.”).
94 See generally Esbeck, supra note 64, at 33 (1998) (discussing standing, class-wide remedies, 
church autonomy, and the nondelegation rule as verification of the structuralist view).
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opportunity to subject claims of religious institutions to strict scrutiny.95 In 
this way, theories like those of Lupu and Tuttle must concede—as they in 
fact do96—that certain failures to police sexual misconduct within religious 
institutions will go unpunished because there can be no constitutional 
inquiry into the religious structures and religious standards of, for example, 
houses of worship. And that constraint remains true regardless of the 
severity of the sexual misconduct implicated in the case.97 A theory of 
adjudicative disability, because it is grounded in the Establishment Clause, 
simply has no way to take those kinds of considerations into account.98
In this way, a theory of adjudicative disability, with its basis in the 
Establishment Clause, may fall short in providing a mechanism to prevent 
some of the worst offenses within religious institutions. And in turn, like 
                                                                                                                         
95 See, e.g., Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org. v. City of Clearwater, 2 F.3d 1514, 1543 (11th 
Cir. 1993) (“Thus, we have concluded, the Establishment Clause may condemn certain entanglements 
that take the form of civil intervention in church political organization under Lemon even if they might 
otherwise have been justifiable under the strict scrutiny of the Free Exercise Clause.”).
96 See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text (summarizing Lupu and Tuttle’s arguments that 
“many claims alleging that a religious institution breached its fiduciary duty to one of its 
members . . . are constitutionally off limits.”). For more of my prior work discussing sexual misconduct 
cases and implied consent, see Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 551–53.
97 As examples of cases where the Establishment Clause foreclosed liability notwithstanding the 
severe consequences of the underlying sexual misconduct, see Doe v. Evans, 718 So. 2d 286, 291 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998) (“In a church defendant’s determination to hire or retain a minister, or in 
its capacity as supervisor of that minister, a church defendant’s conduct is guided by religious doctrine 
and/or practice. Thus, a court's determination regarding whether the church defendant’s conduct was 
‘reasonable’ would necessarily entangle the court in issues of the church's religious law, practices, and 
policies . . . . A court faced with the task of determining a claim of negligent hiring, retention, and 
supervision would measure the church defendants' conduct against that of a reasonable employer; a 
proscribed comparison.”), quashed by 814 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2002); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 
332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“It would therefore also be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this Court to 
determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained the defendant 
Bishop. Any award of damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the 
future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result violative of the text and history of the 
establishment clause.” (citation omitted)). By contrast, an inquiry that incorporates strict scrutiny has the 
built-in safeguard to override the constitutional status of a religious institution. See, e.g., Doe v. Dorsey, 
683 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1996) (“[W]e are persuaded that just as the State may 
prevent a church from offering human sacrifices, it may protect its children against injuries caused by 
pedophiles by authorizing civil damages against a church that knowingly (including should know) creates 
a situation in which such injuries are likely to occur. We recognize that the State's interest must be 
compelling indeed in order to interfere in the church's selection, training and assignment of its clerics. 
We would draw the line at criminal conduct.”), abrogated by Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2002).
98 See, e.g., Molly A. Gerratt, Closing a Loophole: Headley v. Church of Scientology International 
as an Argument for Placing Limits on the Ministerial Exception from Clergy Disputes, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 141, 165–66 (“Unlike in free exercise jurisprudence, there is no risk that a compelling government 
interest test will allow cases to proceed if the ministerial exception is derived from the Establishment 
Clause.”). It is worth noting here that Hosanna-Tabor links the ministerial exception to both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012). Lupu and Tuttle have argued that, as a result, an implied consent 
approach misreads Hosanna-Tabor. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1300. To be clear, it is not a 
misreading, just a disagreement with the Court’s analysis.
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sovereignty theories, it may leave us searching for another overarching 
framework for the protections afforded religious institutions—one that 
recognizes their unique constitutional status, but simultaneously allows 
courts to directly take other important government interests into account 
when determining the limits of religious institutional autonomy.
II. IMPLIED CONSENT: A PRIMER
Current doctrine continues to search for an underlying theoretical 
framework for the legal status of religious institutions. In the wake of 
Employment Division v. Smith, constitutional doctrine has struggled to 
reconcile the historical autonomy granted to religious institutions and the 
narrowing application of the Free Exercise Clause only to laws that are not 
neutral and generally applicable.
Importantly, the constitutional dimensions of this challenge have spilled 
over into statutory debates. In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA).99 By its terms, RFRA prohibits government from 
“substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden 
“is in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “is the least 
restrictive means of furthering” that interest100—the very constitutional 
standard that was explicitly rejected by the Court in Employment Division v. 
Smith.101
Although RFRA stands as its own statutory provision, its primary 
purpose was linked to the Free Exercise jurisprudence prior to the Court’s 
decision in Smith. In outlining its overall purpose, the House Report 
characterized RFRA as “turn[ing] the clock back to the day before Smith
was decided.”102 Indeed, the Congressional findings incorporated into the 
text of RFRA further emphasize that the core object of RFRA was to undo 
the impact of Smith, expressing dismay over the fact that “in Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious 
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion . . . . ”103
                                                                                                                         
99 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2013).
100 Id. § 2000bb-1(a), (b)(1)–(2).
101 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that 
Oregon’s denial of unemployment benefits was consistent with the Free Exercise Clause because the 
plaintiff violated a state law that was facially neutral and generally applicable). The Supreme Court’s 
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores limited Congress’s RFRA to federal laws, holding that Congress 
lacked constitutional authority to enforce RFRA against states. 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997). Many states 
responded to Boerne by passing their own RFRA’s—so-called mini-RFRA’s. See Christopher C. Lund, 
Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
102 See H.R. REP. No. 103-88, at 15 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4).
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By turning back the clock on Smith, RFRA provided an additional 
avenue for religious institutions to secure exemptions from neutral and 
generally applicable laws. But RFRA expressed precious little about the 
framework for assessing the claims of religious institutions. Thus, while 
RFRA may have provided broader protections for religious institutions, it 
did not explain where and to what extent religious institutions ought to be 
granted a unique status within the legal order. To the contrary, the RFRA 
claims asserted by religious institutions—like parallel First Amendment 
claims—are in pressing need of a broader framework to explain their origin 
and scope.104 Many of the clashes between religious institutions and other 
important government interests—such as contraception and same-sex 
marriage—have come to a head in the RFRA context.105 And like the First 
Amendment challenges sketched above, the boundaries of RFRA remain 
highly uncertain and deeply contested. At the core of these challenges lies a 
single question: What framework should inform the doctrine affording 
protection to religious institutions?
Instead of institutional theories grounded in the inherent sovereignty of 
religious institutions or the adjudicative disability of courts, I have argued 
that the authority and autonomy of religious institutions ought to be seen as 
deriving from the implied consent of their membership.106 To understand 
how this theory works requires explaining the two fundamental principles 
underlying an implied consent approach to religious institutions.
The first principle of implied consent institutionalism is voluntarism.
Voluntarism is “the freedom to make religious choices for oneself, free from 
governmental compulsion or improper influence.”107 And, in turn, a 
voluntarism-based approach to religious institutions sees those institutions
as valuable because they are borne out of the voluntary choices of their 
members.108 Grounding the value of religious institutions in voluntarism 
firmly entrenches the constitutional protections afforded religious 
institutions under the umbrella of the Free Exercise Clause. Religious 
institutions are created through the voluntary decisions of individuals to join 
together and pursue shared religious values.
As I have discussed previously, the value of voluntarism has long been 
foundational to the philosophical and constitutional principle of religious 
                                                                                                                         
104 Id. § 2000bb-1(a).
105 See supra notes 14–28 and accompanying text.
106 Supra note 5.
107 DANIEL O. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE RELIGION CLAUSES 39 (2d ed. 2009); see also
John Witte Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitutional Experiment,
71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 390 (1996) (describing voluntarism as expressing our constitutional 
commitment to “the unencumbered ability to choose and change one’s religious beliefs and adherences”).
108 See generally Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 79, at 961–62 (arguing that churches have 
autonomy because the institution itself is a “product of free association,” deriving its power from the 
voluntary consent of its members). 
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liberty.109 It can be traced from John Locke, through Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, all the way through early Supreme Court conceptions of 
religious institutional autonomy.110 The principle of voluntarism flows from 
a fundamental commitment to freedom of conscience—that is, the freedom 
to make choices about religious belief and practice in the absence of 
improper government influence.
The second foundational principle of implied consent institutionalism is 
that religion is predominantly experienced as a social or collective
phenomenon. Accordingly, “[r]eligion, as understood both by the framers 
and contemporary observers, is primarily a group phenomenon . . . .”111 Or, 
put in the negative, “[r]eligion is rarely an individual endeavor. Instead, 
people come together, bound in collective belief, worship, and related 
action.”112 Robert Cover famously captured this impulse toward collective 
religious experience in constitutional terms: “The religion clauses of the 
Constitution seem to me unique in the clarity with which they presuppose 
a collective, norm-generating community whose status as a community and 
whose relationship with the individuals subject to its norms are entitled to 
constitutional recognition and protection.”113 Religious institutions, in turn, 
serve as focal points for the collective exercise of religion, providing the 
institutional infrastructure that makes religious exercise possible.114
All told, an implied consent theory of religious institutionalism relies on 
these twin principles: it values religious decisions to the extent they 
represent voluntary choices of conscience and it presumes that religious 
aspirations are typically pursued and experienced by groups or collectivities.
And not surprisingly, these two principles played central roles in the 
development of Supreme Court doctrine on the constitutional treatment of 
religious institutions.115
For example, in its 1871 decision Watson v. Jones, the Supreme Court 
grounded the authority of religious institutions in the voluntary choices of 
their members, arguing “[t]hat in so far as the law can regard them, the
powers of the church judicatories are derived solely from the consent of the 
                                                                                                                         
109 See, e.g., Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 567–72 (noting that Locke, 
Jefferson, and Madison discussed the voluntary choice to freely practice religion as a cornerstone of life 
in civil society, which continues to “serve[] as the North Star” in free exercise cases). 
110 Id.
111 Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 
BYU L. REV. 7, 24 (1993).
112 Zoë Robinson, What Is a Religious Institution?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 206 (2014).
113 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 n.94 (1982).
114 See Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the 
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 294–95 (2008) (arguing for the importance of religious 
institutions because they “contribute to . . . the reality of religious freedom under the law” by serving as 
part of the infrastructure upon which “the freedom of religion depends”). 
115 See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 79, at 975–76, 982–83 (discussing voluntary 
religious choice and religious group identity in Supreme Court precedent). 
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members of the church . . . .”116 Similarly, in its 1929 decision Gonzalez v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, the Supreme Court explicitly 
grounded church autonomy in the consent of the religious institution’s 
members, holding that “the decisions of the proper church tribunals on 
matters purely ecclesiastical . . . are accepted in litigation before the secular 
courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract 
or otherwise.”117
In formulating the special treatment of religious institutions in terms of 
voluntary choice, the Court provided a unique gloss on how such 
voluntariness would be legally inferred: “All who unite themselves to such 
a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to 
submit to it.”118 In this way, joining a church or other religious institution 
entails an implicit consent authorizing the institution to self-govern and 
resolve internal disputes.
What justifies inferring implicit consent to the authority of a religious 
institution from joining that institution? According to the Court in Watson,
the justification is tied directly to the desire of individuals to pursue religious 
experience as collectivities: “It is of the essence of these religious unions, 
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising 
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of 
ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself 
provides for.”119 Thus the reason why we can legally infer implied consent 
from the mere act of joining a religious institution is because it tracks the 
general impulse of individuals to pursue religious experiences and objectives 
as a collective—and pursuing those religious experiences and objectives are 
only possible if institutions develop internal religious rules and doctrine to 
organize individuals into a religious collectivity. 
Watson captured this intuition in the converse formulation: “[I]t would 
be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious 
bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the 
secular courts and have them reversed.”120 If institutions could not 
promulgate rules and render decisions regarding the collective pursuit of 
religious aspirations, then individuals would not be able to join together into 
functioning collectivities geared towards achieving shared religious 
objectives and experiences. Accordingly, if religious decisions are valued to 
the extent they are voluntary, and if individuals are presumed to desire 
collective pursuit of religious aspirations, then the law can infer, from the 
                                                                                                                         
116 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 710 (1871).
117 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). The Court continued 
by noting that “[u]nder like circumstances, effect is given in the courts to the determinations of the 
judicatory bodies established by clubs and civil associations.” Id. at 16í17.
118 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729 (emphasis added).
119 Id.
120 Id.
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mere act of joining a religious institution, that individuals implicitly grant 
the relevant institution the authority and autonomy necessary for the 
institution to enable the collective to reach its shared religious goals.
In leveraging this voluntarist impulse and the collective nature of 
religious pursuit, an implied consent theory most closely tracks John 
Locke’s theory of tolerance. According to Locke, individuals voluntarily 
join churches to achieve “the Salvation of their Souls” and this “hope of 
Salvation” serves as the motivation for “Members voluntarily uniting” into 
a church.121 However, Locke notes, in order to successfully accomplish such 
objectives, the church must “be regulated by some Laws, and the Members 
all consent to observe some Order.”122
Importantly, the rules and order brought to bear on a religious 
institution, according to Locke, could not come from civil society. Civil 
society is not organized to pursue particular religious conceptions of the 
good; it seeks to “procur[e], preserv[e], and advanc[e] . . . Civil Interests,” 
such as “Life, Liberty, Health and Indolence of Body; and the Possession of 
outward things, such as Money, Land, Houses, Furniture, and the like.”123
This is all by design; by focusing its efforts and energies on “outward 
things,” a civil society avoids taking sides on how its citizens should lead 
the good life, leaving room for the deep value-pluralism that typifies the 
liberal nation-state.
The members of a religious institution, if they hope to successfully and 
collectively pursue religious objectives, must therefore consent to 
authorizing their shared institution to serve that role—that is, to “regulate 
. . . some laws” and “observe some order.”124 Religious associations are 
formed in order to pursue a particular conception of the good life, tied up 
with specific notions of faith and salvation. As phrased by Locke, “everyone 
joins himself voluntarily to that Society in which he believes he has found 
that Profession and Worship which is truly acceptable to God.”125 But 
without the ability to promulgate religious rules, religious institutions would 
not be able to pursue those shared religious aspirations. In the words of 
Locke, without granting religious institutions rule-making and 
dispute-resolution authority, the “Church . . . will presently dissolve and 
break in pieces.”126
In sum, from the vantage point of a religious institution’s membership, 
the pursuit of shared religious objectives can only be done within the 
                                                                                                                         
121 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 15–16 (Mark Goldie ed. 2010).
122 Id. at 16. Example of such necessary rules include “place and time of meeting . . . Rules for 
admitting and excluding Members . . . Distinction of Officers, and putting things into a regular 
Course . . . .” Id.
123 Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
124 Id. at 16.
125 Id. at 15.
126 Id. at 16.
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framework of the religious collective; it would be a non sequitur for the state 
to guide the religious collective in the pursuit of those religious objectives.
The religious rules and regulations necessary to achieve shared religious 
objectives must come internally from the very institution formed by the 
membership to pursue those aspirations. And this underlying theory 
animated the Watson Court’s formulation of religious institutional 
autonomy. As the Court explained, “it would be a vain consent and would 
lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by 
one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them 
reversed.”127
The logic underlying an implied consent theory of religious 
institutionalism highlights its differences from other prevailing theories for 
why the law ought to treat religious institutions differently. Contrary to 
sovereignty theories, an implied consent approach does not grant any 
inherent autonomy to religious institutions. Religious institutions derive 
their authority from the voluntary choices of their members—members who 
cede some degree of autonomy and authority to religious institutions in order 
to facilitate the shared religious objectives of the membership.
An implied consent theory also stands in opposition to theories that 
translate the autonomy of religious institutions as simply a byproduct of the 
prohibition against courts becoming impermissibly entangled with religious 
questions, doctrines, or practices. The starkest distinction is that implied 
consent theory—because of its emphasis on the affirmative decision to join 
a religious institution—flows from the Free Exercise Clause, valuing the 
voluntary decisions of individuals to collectively pursue religious 
objectives. It is not simply the result of an adjudicative vacuum created by 
the Establishment Clause prohibiting courts from intervening in internal 
religious matters and thereby becoming entangled with religious doctrine.
III. THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF IMPLIED CONSENT: A DEFENSE
An implied consent theory of religious institutionalism relies on the 
voluntary choice of members as the legitimating force driving the authority 
and autonomy granted religious institutions. Members of religious 
institutions implicitly grant those institutions authority and autonomy to 
make rules and resolve disputes to the extent necessary in order to 
successfully pursue shared collective religious goals and aspirations.
By conditioning the authority and autonomy of religious institutions on 
this implied consent, the theory remains true to its core voluntarist impulse, 
which values the freedom to make religious choices free from coercion. The
autonomy of religious institutions over internal religious decision-making 
retains this voluntarist character in that it flows from the authority granted 
voluntarily by the collective membership.
                                                                                                                         
127 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
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The fulcrum of an implied consent theory is the argument that the law 
can infer implicit consent to the authority and autonomy of a religious 
institution from the mere fact that a member joined the institution. The
rationale for this inference runs as follows. Individuals typically pursue 
religious goals—like faith, prayer, and salvation—in concert with others. In 
so doing, they join together to form institutions that allow them to fulfill this 
impulse to pursue shared religious principles and values as a collective.
To pursue these shared religious objectives, collectives must set up some 
institutional framework to establish religious rules and resolve religious 
disputes. The state cannot play this role because it lacks the institutional 
resources and constitutional authority to promulgate religious rules that 
could provide a framework for the collective pursuit of religious aspirations 
shared by a religious institution’s membership. And without an institutional 
framework for religious rule-making and dispute resolution, the very 
objective of joining together into a religious collective would be thwarted.
Accordingly, members—from the very act of joining an institution in pursuit 
of shared religious objectives—must be understood to grant a religious 
institution the necessary authority and autonomy to support those shared 
objectives. In the words of Locke, without institutional authority the 
“Church . . . will presently dissolve and break in pieces . . . .”128
To be sure, while an implied consent theory builds on the nature of 
rule-making and decision-making within religious institutions, it does not 
read notions of consent into the theological self-understanding of religious 
collectivities. Thus, to embrace an implied consent theory does not require 
viewing religious institutions—or their relationship with their 
membership—as necessarily consensual. To the contrary, as Jessie Hill has 
emphasized in her criticism of implied consent institutionalism, religious 
institutions often view their relationships with members as 
nonconsensual.129 But the internal perceptions held by institutions need not 
dictate what the law considers relevant for evaluating whether members 
have legitimately ceded religious institutions authority or autonomy.
Accordingly, religious institutions might view their membership 
relationships as inherent or a function of birth. But what makes those 
relationships relevant and valuable to the state from an implied consent 
perspective is the extent to which the membership has demonstrated, even if 
implicitly, that they also consent to that relationship and that the relationship 
persists because of that consent. It is in that way that implied consent 
leverages a voluntarist impulse. Religious institutions can view themselves 
                                                                                                                         
128 Locke, supra note 121, at 16.
129 See Hill, supra note 6, at 426 (arguing that implied consent is a descriptively inaccurate 
characterization of the self-understanding within many religious communities, noting that “numerous 
religious traditions embrace modes of becoming members that have nothing whatsoever to do with
consent, such as infant baptism (in numerous Christian denominations, including Catholicism) or 
matrilineal descent (in Judaism)”).
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however they so choose, but an implied consent theory contends that the law 
should value the relationship between religious institutions and their 
members—and accordingly grant some legally recognized degree of 
authority and autonomy—only to the extent that there exist sufficient 
indications to justify categorizing the relationship as voluntary. 
A. Implied Consent Through “Membership”
As should be clear by now, an implied consent model relies heavily on 
the notion of volitional membership in a religious institution. And it is 
precisely here where many critics have aimed their fire. For example, Lupu 
and Tuttle have argued that “[i]mplied consent is a strong and unjustified 
inference to be drawn from membership, standing alone.”130 Or, as 
emphasized by Hill, “[i]ndividuals do not always enter religious 
communities voluntarily, and they do not always stay because they want 
to.”131
To unpack the question of inferring implied consent from membership, 
let us begin with the prototypical model of membership in a religious 
institution: an individual choosing to join a house of worship. Indications 
that an individual is a member of that institution could include, for example, 
paying some sort of annual dues, attending services at that house of worship,
or any other participation in the collective pursuit of religious objectives.
Again, as some critics have noted, the choice to join a house of 
worship—or any other religious institution—is not purely volitional. There 
are some pressures at play. An individual may have been born into a 
particular faith or may have begun attending a specific house of worship as 
a minor and merely continued that participation into adulthood after 
becoming somewhat attached—in terms of identity or socially—to the house 
of worship. Thus, even the prototypical membership in a religious institution 
might not be viewed as purely volitional.132
This is, of course, true. And in that way, criticism of the volitional nature 
of entry into a religious institution captures the core intuition that nearly all 
forms of consent are not purely volitional. This is also true of nearly all 
contracts; my choice to purchase food is somewhat pressured by my need to 
eat. To the extent a theory justifies obligation based upon consent, it requires 
line drawing as to how much consent is necessary. Thus, courts adopting an 
implied consent model, even in the prototypical case, might agree on the 
basic principles, but disagree on where to draw the line. Cases like Watson 
indicate that the Supreme Court, at least at one point in time, thought 
background considerations like a preexisting religious affiliation were not 
                                                                                                                         
130 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1300.
131 Hill, supra note 6, at 425.
132 See supra notes 130–131 and accompanying text.
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enough to render consent to joining a religious institution nonconsensual.133
And some might disagree with this assessment. This kind of disagreement 
can all happen within an implied consent framework.
A second, and related, objection to even the prototypical instances of 
implied consent is not simply that there is not enough consent, but that there 
is an insufficient basis to infer whether a particular member has, in fact, 
consented to the authority of the religious institution to make rules and 
resolve disputes related to the shared religious objectives of the 
membership.134 In the prototypical case, the argument for inferring implied 
consent is at its strongest. A house of worship conveys a clear message to 
members that it is an institution with religious objectives. And, leveraging 
the Lockean argument, the house of worship can assume that its members
are on notice of a core religious institution, which aims to promote the 
collective pursuit of religious objectives, must make necessary religious 
rules and regulations to achieve those objectives.135 In this way, an implied 
consent framework contends that the religious institution can infer consent 
to its authority over matters necessary to the pursuit of collective religious 
objectives from the mere act of joining the institution.
This inference from volitional membership, however, is only justified 
so long as the individual member does not end his or her relationship with 
the house of worship. In instances, for example, where an individual 
withdraws from a church, a church certainly can no longer lay claim to 
authority over that individual based on implied consent—that consent has 
clearly lapsed with the individual’s exit from the institution.
This emphasis on exit is of central importance in cases of communal 
shunning. Some houses of worship have the practice of “shun[ning] 
members of their religious communities for failing to abide by shared 
religious rules of conduct.”136 Such shunning typically “involves the 
complete withdrawal of social, spiritual, and economic contact from a 
member or former member of a religious group.”137 At times, these practices 
have given rise to claims of defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. For the most part, such suits have been dismissed on 
church autonomy grounds.138 As articulated by the Ninth Circuit, 
                                                                                                                         
133 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 734 (1871).
134 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6, at 1299–1300 (“For participants, involvement may derive from 
circumstances of birth or early childhood when awareness of institutional policies will be slim or 
none . . . . Implied consent is a strong and unjustified inference to be drawn from membership, standing 
alone.”)
135 Locke, supra note 121, at 16.
136 Helfand, Church Autonomy, supra note 5, at 1937 (citing Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the 
Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 181 (2011)).
137 Id. (citing Justin K. Miller, Comment, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Religious 
Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 272 (1988)).
138 See id. (citing Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Church or Religious Society and the 
Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 435–36 (1952)); see also Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s 
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“[c]hurches are afforded great latitude when they impose discipline . . . . 
‘[R]eligious activities which concern only members of the faith are and 
ought to be free—as nearly absolutely free as anything can be.’”139
This, of course, makes sense from an implied consent perspective so 
long as the individual remains a member of the institution. By joining a 
house of worship, an individual certainly consents to that institution 
enforcing religious standards to ensure that the collective can pursue 
religious aspirations. Indeed, such instances may represent the strongest 
claims of authority and autonomy of a religious institution. But what 
happens when a member leaves a church? Can the church still engage in 
defamatory conduct or intentionally inflict emotional distress? 
Institutional claims based upon the inherent sovereignty of religious 
institutions or on the adjudicative disability of courts are unlikely to 
differentiate between members pre- and post-withdrawal. Sovereignty 
claims would presumably extend regardless of whether the individual is still 
a member;140 and claims of adjudicative disability are likely to emphasize 
the judicial challenges of evaluating the truth of religiously defamatory 
statements, a central component of adjudicating such claims given that truth 
is a defense to defamation.141
But from an implied consent perspective, houses of worship are shielded 
from liability against conduct related to shunning only so long as the 
individual remains a member. Once an individual exits the membership, the 
inference of implied consent is no longer justified and therefore the rights of 
authority and autonomy with respect to that member must end. If we are to 
ground religious institutionalism in some form of consent, then the import 
of a member’s exit must be central to such a theory.142 And indeed, some 
                                                                                                                         
Soul: Regulating Religious Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 191 (2011); Justin K. 
Miller, Comment, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't: Religious Shunning and the Free Exercise 
Clause, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 290 (1988).
139 Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
140 Several courts have apparently adopted a sovereignty-like approach. See id. at 883 (“Churches 
are afforded great latitude when they impose discipline on members or former members.”); Sands v. 
Living Word Fellowship, 34 P.3d 955, 959 (Alaska 2001) (holding that shunning practices are protected 
by the First Amendment in the context of a suit against non-church members); see also Anderson v. 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29, *62–66 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 
19, 2007) (holding that “[s]hunning is religiously based conduct, a religious practice based on 
interpretation of scripture, and is subject to the protection of the First Amendment” and not differentiating 
between conduct committed pre-disfellowship and post-disfellowship).
141 See, e.g., Anderson, 2007 Tenn. App. LEXIS 29, at *96–97 (“If, to resolve [a] particular claim 
brought, a court would need to resolve underlying controversies over religious doctrine, then the claim 
is precluded.”); see also Klagsbrun v. Va’ad Harabonim, 53 F. Supp. 2d 732, 742 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding 
that the defendant could not be found liable for religious defamation because “the Establishment Clause 
is implicated whenever courts must interpret, evaluate, or apply underlying religious doctrine to resolve 
disputes involving religious organizations”).
142 DeGirolami has criticized this possibility of withdrawing implied consent, noting both the 
practical challenges of identifying the point of withdrawal as well as his concern that in the context of 
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courts have taken this approach, limiting the house of worship’s shield from 
liability to only pre-withdrawal conduct.143 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reasoned in one such case of religious shunning, “[b]y voluntarily uniting 
with the church, [the plaintiff] impliedly consented to submitting to its form 
of religious government.”144 Therefore, “[w]hen she later removed herself 
from membership, [the plaintiff] withdrew her consent, depriving the 
Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual life through overt 
disciplinary acts.”145
To be sure, sometimes the problem runs deeper than attempts to defame 
or intentionally inflict emotional distress on a former member. Sometimes 
circumstances make actually exiting the community such an onerous burden 
that members who want to leave cannot overcome the pressures to remain 
within the fold. In the words of Hill, “although individuals have a legal right 
to leave a religious tradition, informal sanctions might attend that choice, 
such as loss of custody of a child or loss of employment. Though perhaps 
not coercive in a legal sense, such burdens are substantial . . . .”146 But the 
implied consent model can meet this challenge head on and without apology. 
Where the burdens of exit become sufficiently significant, an implied 
consent model ceases to justify the authority or autonomy of a religious 
institution; if members cannot reasonably leave the institution, then their 
consent is a fiction. 
Of course, the devil is in the details here. How significant must the 
hurdles to exiting the institutional community be before remaining a member 
ceases to have legal significance? This kind of question raises similar 
line-drawing problems to those courts face when applying the duress defense 
to contract formation. Should those hurdles have to be wrongful, improper, 
                                                                                                                         
the ministerial exception, “this resolution greatly compromises and weakens the reach of the ministerial 
exception.” DeGirolami, supra note 6, at 117. As DeGirolami argues, “consent to the contract is not 
generally revocable, at least not without the payment of damages for breach.” Id. This is, of course, true. 
On my account, however, withdrawing consent would only be effective prospectively, not 
retrospectively. In this way, it would not work to undo the authority and autonomy of a religious 
institution related to conduct prior to the withdrawal. Instead, withdrawing consent would simply mean 
that there is no longer an “agreement,” so to speak going forward such that the member is no longer 
pursuing religious objectives as part of the religious institution’s collective. 
143 See, e.g., Smith v. Calvary Christian Church, 592 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d,
14 N.W.2d 590 (Mich. 2000) (holding that plaintiff’s conduct evidenced his implied consent to the 
church’s practices); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding the First 
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(holding that prewithdrawal discipline was not actionable because plaintiff had consented to such 
conduct, post-withdrawal discipline was actionable).
144 Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777.
145 Id. at 779.
146 Hill, supra note 6, at 426.
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or maybe something even more significant?147 This kind of question requires 
a context-sensitive inquiry—an inquiry that is vital if implied consent will 
do the work necessary in order to justify the authority and autonomy of 
religious institutions.148
The bigger challenge for an implied consent theory, however, is that it 
hopes to illuminate not only the prototypical cases of membership, but also 
the more complicated “membership relationship” of employees at religious 
institutions. The most obvious employment cases for houses of worship are 
those involving their religious leaders. An implied consent approach to the 
employment relationship between religious leaders and houses of worship 
generally presumes that the leader has granted wide authority and autonomy 
to his or her employer. By agreeing to be a minister, imam, or rabbi, an 
employee implicitly recognizes that he or she is part of a collective—indeed, 
is leading a collective—in the pursuit of religious objectives. And to make 
that relationship functional, the religious institution must establish religious 
rules to channel this collective pursuit. From the vantage point of the 
religious leader, there is unlikely to be any question as to his or her implied 
consent to religious rules geared to the pursuit of religious objectives. An 
implied consent approach is therefore likely to conclude that a religious 
leader has both granted authority to the religious institution to resolve 
employment disputes internally and to have also relinquished any ability to 
pursue such claims in civil courts.149 In this way, an implied consent 
approach overlaps with paradigmatic examples of the ministerial exception, 
granting the religious institution the same kind of autonomy granted by the 
Court in Hosanna-Tabor.150
Cases become more complicated as we move away from the house of 
worship-minister relationship. One axis on which the nature of a case might 
change is the role of the employee in question. Cases of a minister prove 
relatively easy from an implied consent perspective; cases of a church’s 
                                                                                                                         
147 See, e.g., Totem Marine Tug & Barge v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15, 22 (Alaska 
1978) (“Courts have not attempted to define exactly what constitutes a wrongful or coercive act, as 
wrongfulness depends on the particular facts in each case.”).
148 For more discussion on the challenges of religious duress in a related context, see Michael A. 
Helfand, Arbitration’s Counter-Narrative: The Religious Arbitration Paradigm, 124 YALE L.J. 2994,
3042–51 (2015) [hereinafter Helfand, Arbitration], which analyzes claims of communal duress in the 
context of religious arbitration.
149 To be sure, there may be some instances where even religious leaders and religious institutions 
demonstrate, through neutral contract terms, that they will submit disputes to some specified form of 
dispute resolution. In those circumstances, contract terminology can serve as a mechanism to withdraw 
a matter from the authority and autonomy of the religious institution and thereby demonstrate that the 
presumption of implied consent no longer holds. For more on this point, see Helfand, Church Autonomy,
supra note 5, at 1940–42.
150 See id. at 1896–97 (noting that “in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court affirmed the ministerial exception, 
which exempts religious institutions from complying with various employment statutes in the hiring and 
firing of ‘ministers’”).
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music director or communications director prove somewhat more 
challenging.151 In this context, courts often adopt a functional approach, 
analogizing between a minister and other employees of a house of worship. 
Thus, a court might ask how central a particular employee is to the religious 
purpose of the institution.152 An adjudicative disability approach might focus 
more directly on the particular claims at stake in a dispute; that is, can a court 
resolve a specific employment dispute between an employee and a house of 
worship without becoming entangled in religious questions or doctrine?153
An implied consent approach asks a somewhat different question: Do
the circumstances give rise to a sufficiently justified inference that the 
employee impliedly consented to the authority of the religious institution to 
promulgate rules and resolve disputes related to the employee’s membership 
in the institution? Accordingly, an implied consent approach does not 
impose functional limits on the nature of the employee that might be subject 
to the authority of a religious institution. There is no objective category of 
sufficiently religious employment roles that fall under the umbrella of a 
religious institution’s autonomy. The question is what we can infer from the 
context in which a person accepted employment with a religious institution. 
One instance where these approaches might lead to different results is in 
the context of general studies teachers in religious schools. A functional 
approach might focus on the fact that the teacher does not have religious 
duties.154 By contrast, an implied consent approach might focus more 
directly on whether a general studies teacher understood his or her 
employment responsibilities to be part and parcel with the religious 
aspirations of the religious institution. For example, were there specific 
                                                                                                                         
151 See, e.g., EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(church’s music director); see also Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (church’s press secretary).
152 Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d at 802 (applying the exception to a church’s music director 
because “music is a vital means of expressing and celebrating those beliefs which a religious community 
holds most sacred. Music is an integral part of many different religious traditions.”); see also 
Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 704 (applying the exception to a church’s press secretary because “[t]he 
role of the press secretary is critical in message dissemination, and a church’s message, of course, is of 
singular importance”).
153 See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 465–66 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (discussing the 
Establishment Clause prohibitions implicated by assessing the quality of an employee’s Canon Law 
scholarship).
154 See, e.g., EEOC v. Tree of Life Christian Sch., 751 F. Supp. 700, 706 (S.D. Ohio 1990) 
(“Although it appears undisputed that the principles of the Christian faith pervade the schools’ 
educational activities, this alone would not make a teacher or administrator a ‘minister’ for purposes of 
exempting that person from the FLSA’s definition of ‘employee.’”); see also Gallo v. Salesian Soc’y, 
Inc., 676 A.2d 580, 590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“Defendants now rely on this stipulation [that 
‘religion permeates the school atmosphere’], plus ‘The philosophy of Don Bosco Preparatory High 
School’ and the guide to hiring teachers, ‘Characteristics of Teachers in Catholic Schools,’ to support 
their contention that all parochial school teachers, regardless of the subject taught, perform a ministerial 
function. However, none of these generalized contentions support the conclusion that propagation of the 
faith was an integral part of the curriculum in secular subjects taught by plaintiff.”).
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religious values that the general studies teacher is expected to integrate into 
the curriculum? Were there curricular limitations placed upon the teacher to 
ensure that the classroom material conformed to shared religious values 
within the relevant faith community? And were these expectations conveyed 
to the employee at the outset of the employment relationship or only after 
the fact? From an implied consent approach, answers to these questions 
would illuminate whether there was a sufficient basis to infer that the 
employee understood that he or she was joining a religious institution in 
pursuit of collective religious objectives. And where the concept of 
membership was aptly applied, the religious institution ought to be deemed 
as having authority and autonomy to resolve internal religious disputes.
Cases also vary along the employer axis. In some employment cases, the 
institution claiming a religious status is not a house of worship, but some 
other class of institution. These cases range from non-profit institutions, 
such as hospitals, universities, and social service organizations, to various 
for-profit businesses, such as bakers, florists, and photographers.155 The 
question of “what is a religious institution” may be the most hotly contested 
issue in recent litigation. Most notably, it was central to the litigation 
between religiously motivated for-profit companies and the government 
over whether RFRA allowed these businesses to exclude contraception 
coverage from their employees’ insurance plans in contravention of the 
contraception mandate.156 And it is likely to emerge as cases persist between 
religiously motivated business owners who have refused to provide their 
services at same-sex weddings in contravention of prevailing 
public-accommodations laws. In a number of cases, the question of what 
qualifies as a religious institution has been a key threshold question.157
Some scholars, as well as the government—at least at times158—have 
argued that organizations, by definition, cannot be “religious” and for-profit 
                                                                                                                         
155 See Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
818 F.3d 1122, 1136 (11th Cir. 2016) (media network); Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 
609 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2007, 195 L. Ed. 2d 210 (2016) 
(university); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (baker);
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (florist); Elane Photography, LLC v. 
Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 60 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014) (photographer).
156 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–72 (2014) (discussing the 
meanings of “person” and “exercise of religion” included in RFRA and whether they apply to the 
corporation).
157 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 291 (Colo. App. 2015), 
(concluding that Masterpiece was not exempt under the religious-purpose exemption), overturned
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); State v. Arlene’s 
Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 560–61 (Wash. 2017) (noting the appellant’s argument that the Washington 
Law Against Discrimination is “unfair” because it does not extend the “religious organization” 
exemption to her business), vacated and remanded sub. nom., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 
S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
158 See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 12–13, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) (No. 
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because the profit motive and religious motivation are mutually exclusive.159
Others have identified more nuanced dividing lines between those 
institutions that qualify as religious institutions and those that don’t quite fit 
into that category based upon the quantum of religious conduct within the 
relevant organizations.160
By contrast, and as with the employee question, an implied consent 
approach focuses not on the inherent or objective religious nature of the 
organization—or whether the institution is a for-profit or a non-profit 
institution—but on whether the context justifies an inference of implied 
consent to the authority and autonomy of the institution.161 To justify such 
an inference, the employer must clearly convey to its prospective employees 
that they are working at an institution geared towards the pursuit of 
collective religious objectives. Without clearly conveying the collective 
pursuit of religious objectives, there would be no reason for prospective 
employees, when choosing to accept employment, to grant autonomy and 
authority to the institution to make religious rules and establish methods of 
religious dispute resolution. Members only grant that authority and 
autonomy so that the institution can make the rules necessary to reach the 
collective religious objectives.162 But if there is no basis for employees to 
know of their employer’s religious objectives, then there would be no reason 
for them to have impliedly consented to their employer’s autonomy or 
authority.163
                                                                                                                         
CIV-12-1000-HE) (“Hobby Lobby is a for-profit, secular employer, and a secular entity by definition
does not exercise religion.”); Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
15, Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012) (Civil Action No. 
12-1635 (RBW)) (“Tyndale is a for-profit employer that cannot ‘exercise religion’ under RFRA and the 
Free Exercise Clause.”).
159 See Harry G. Hutchison, Religious Liberty for Employers as Corporations, Natural Persons or 
Mythical Beings? A Reply to Gans, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 537, 546 (2015) (discussing another scholar’s 
belief “that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion because they lack human attributes”).
160 See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of 
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514, 1539–40 (1979) (explaining the 
“emanation[s]” of the church’s activities and what should be outside of governmental regulation). For 
another recent and insightful approach to the question, see Robinson, supra note 110, at 181, which 
argues for a definition of religious institution that focuses on the institution’s protection of “individual 
conscience” and “group rights,” as well as its ability to provide “desirable societal structures.” 
161 See Robinson, supra note 112, at 193 (“[A]n institution will only be designated a ‘religious 
institution’ if the employees can be presumed to have impliedly consented to the authority of the 
institution in order to promote those objectives particularly unique to the religion.”).
162 See Helfand, What is a “Church”?, supra note 5, at 402 (discussing how members of a religious 
organization allow the institution’s rules to achieve “religious objectives”).
163 The focus on the perspective of a prospective employee is important. For example, in a 
forthcoming article, Elizabeth Sepper notes the challenges of categorizing hospitals as “religious” when 
they are purchased by Catholic hospital systems. Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 
NW. U. L. REV. 929 (2018). From an implied consent perspective, it would be unlikely to view an 
employee who works for an institution that becomes religiously affiliated after the onset of the 
employment relationship as having impliedly consented to that institution’s religious authority and 
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To be sure, from an implied consent perspective, the standard for 
knowledge of the employer’s religious objectives need not be actual.164 But 
at the same time, to justify an inference of implied consent, it isn’t enough 
simply to be able, as a technical or legal matter, to impute that knowledge.
Consider the following: In some cases, courts approach the question of 
whether an institution is a religious institution by looking at the institution’s 
corporate structure or the extent to which religious standards are built into 
the institution’s bylaws. For example, in Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal 
Presbyterian Hospitals, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the 
defendant, a hospital, should be considered a religious institution for the 
purposes of the ministerial exception.165 In answering the question in the 
affirmative, the court highlighted, among other considerations, that “the 
hospital’s Board of Directors consists of four church representatives and
their unanimously agreed-upon nominees”166 and in addition, the hospital’s 
Articles of Association may be amended only with the 
approval of the Episcopal Diocese of Missouri of the 
Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America 
and the local Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church 
(U.S.A.).167
Identifying religious motivation in corporate bylaws may be relevant if 
the metric for qualifying as a religious institution is the inherent quantum of 
an institution’s religious content. But bylaws provide little to justify an 
inference of implied consent; it seems highly implausible to assume—or 
expect—that employees read an employer’s bylaws prior to accepting 
employment. Instead, under an implied consent framework, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the employer’s conduct was sufficient to convey its 
religious aspirations to its employees and thereby justify an inference of 
implied consent. As another example, consider the Fourth Circuit’s analysis 
in Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Washington.168 While the court 
relied in part on bylaws in evaluating whether the defendant could be 
considered a religious organization, it also highlighted the overt religious 
                                                                                                                         
autonomy. Of course, remaining employed at the institution for an extended period of time after the 
institution adopted a new religious affiliation could constitute some form of ratification of this new 
relationship. But the existing costs of switching employment, combined with other potential exit 
challenges, make such an inference fraught.
164 See Helfand, supra note 5, at 402 (with an “open and obvious” religious mission, courts can 
“presume that employees recognized the unique religious objectives”).
165 Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991).
166 Id.
167 Id.; see also Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“[Hebrew Home’s] By-Laws define it as a religious and charitable non-profit corporation and 
declare that its mission is to provide elder care to ‘aged of the Jewish faith in accordance with the precepts 
of Jewish law and customs.’”).
168 363 F.3d at 306.
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policies and conduct of the defendant that would have clearly conveyed its 
core religious institutional objectives: “[T]he Hebrew Home maintained a 
rabbi on its staff, employed mashgichim to ensure compliance with the 
Jewish dietary laws, and placed a mezuzah on every resident’s doorpost.”169
Indeed, focusing on concrete manifestations of an institution’s religious 
objectives, a number of courts have described the touchstone of the 
“religious institution” inquiry as whether the “entity’s mission is marked by 
clear or obvious religious characteristics.”170 Such analysis fits squarely 
within the types of inquiries embraced by an implied consent framework.171
To see how implied consent might address the “what is a religious 
institution” question in some of the more recent cases, consider the multiple 
plaintiffs contesting the contraception mandate in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby.172 One of the plaintiffs in the litigation before the Supreme 
Court, Mardel, was “an affiliated chain of thirty-five Christian bookstores,”
which exclusively sold Christian books and materials.173 Mardel’s website 
describes itself as “a faith-based company dedicated to renewing minds and 
transforming lives through the products we sell and the ministries we 
support.”174 Thus, it “provide[s] a large selection of Bibles, books, movies, 
gifts, music, kid products, apparel, church and educational supplies, and 
homeschool curriculum.”175 Given the exclusive nature of Mardel’s 
products—and the public description of its services online—there may be 
good reason to infer implied consent from the decision of an individual to 
accept employment with the company.
The more public plaintiff before the Supreme Court, Hobby Lobby, 
provides a more uncertain case. On the one hand, Hobby Lobby—which has 
500 stores and over 13,000 employees—simply sells generic arts and 
                                                                                                                         
169 Id. at 310–11.
170 Id. at 310; see also Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–26 (6th Cir. 2007), 
abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 202–03
(2012) (noting the Fourth Circuit’s approach to categorizing religious institutions in support of extending 
the ministerial exception beyond ordained ministers).
171 Berg has argued that my previous suggestions for what might qualify as conveying to an 
employee the institution’s core and collective religious objectives might be “too strict,” because “[a]n 
organization may be deeply religiously motivated but engage in service activities without an explicitly 
articulated religious message.” Berg, supra note 6, at 1371. As described above, the test is intended to 
capture that the employees understand that they are viewed by their employer as members of a religious 
institution, organized around the pursuit of collective religious objectives. The more an employer could 
be viewed, without conveying otherwise, as a for-profit business pursuing standard economic objectives, 
the more necessary it will be for the employer to dispel that reasonable default assumption with concrete 
manifestations of its religious objectives and aspirations.
172 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014) (describing the 
multiple plaintiffs). 
173 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2013).
174 Our Story, MARDEL, http://www.mardel.com/our-story [https://perma.cc/XZW9-XHJT] (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2018).
175 Id.
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crafts,176 providing little reason to alert a potential employee to the religious 
aspirations of the corporation’s owners. At the same time, Hobby Lobby 
buys hundreds of full-page newspaper advertisements inviting people to 
“know Jesus as Lord and Savior.”177 Indeed, like Mardel, Hobby Lobby is 
closed on Sundays.178 Here there are conflicting indications, and further 
evidence and discovery might serve to crystallize whether Hobby Lobby 
ought to qualify as a religious institution. 
The third plaintiff, Conestoga Wood Specialties, was a custom cabinet 
manufacturer.179 Reviewing the record, it appears to have engaged in limited, 
if any, public manifestations of religion that would have alerted employees 
to its religious objectives.180 And to the extent Conestoga Wood referenced
religion as relevant to its business in some way, it did so either in internal
corporate documents or subsequent to the onset of litigation.181 As a result, 
it would be hard to see—given that record—how employees might have 
been construed to have impliedly consented to its authority and autonomy 
over religious matters given that it never made clear that it even aspired to 
pursue religious objectives.
Questions of implied consent in the employment context, as cases move 
further and further away from the prototypical case or a case of a minister 
employed by a house of worship, become increasingly fraught given the 
potential range of motivations for accepting employment with a particular 
employer. Indeed, maybe the strongest pushback against adopting an 
implied consent framework for employment cases is that many employees 
are not, in reality, joining the religiously motivated institution in order to 
pursue religious objectives. For many, they simply are looking for a job to 
pay the bills.182 As for many of the inquiries embraced by an implied consent 
framework, this inquiry is deeply contextual. For example, in cases where 
an employer is vague about its religious objectives, and the employment 
                                                                                                                         
176 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2765.
177 Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1122.
178 Id.
179 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d 
sub nom., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 
377 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014).
180 For a somewhat detailed discussion of the record on this point, see Helfand, Religious 
Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 576 n.193.
181 Id.; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 402–03 (discussing a reference to 
Christian principles in Conestoga’s mission statement).
182 As we move away from employment and towards different contexts where the stakes are even 
higher, the likelihood of categorizing someone as a member becomes increasingly more problematic. 
Sepper, for example, has considered how an implied consent framework might apply to patients at a 
Catholic hospital. Sepper, supra note 163, at 46–47. The answer, at least in the general run of cases, 
would lean heavily against viewing patients as having joined a religious institution in pursuit of collective 
religious objectives. Indeed, in this way, the implied consent framework provides a useful framework for 
distinguishing between different contexts of purported “membership.”
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conditions in a particular geographic area are particularly challenging, there 
might be good reasons to wonder whether an employee could be viewed as 
truly, albeit implicitly, joining a religious institution in order to pursue 
collective religious objectives. At the same time, the mere fact that a 
prospective employee knows that he or she is simply accepting a job because 
of the pay should not be dispositive where an employer has clearly conveyed 
the religious objectives and aspirations of the business and the role each 
employee is meant to play in the pursuit of those objectives and aspirations.
Drawing lines between these kinds of cases is precisely the type of inquiry 
in which an implied consent framework encourages courts to engage.183
In addition to varying along the employer and employee axes, cases also 
vary as to the stage of relationship between the employer and 
employee—or, more broadly, the member and institution. Leveraging 
implied consent works well once an employee has joined an employer or 
when a member has joined an institution; it is in those cases where we can 
most directly test whether the nature of the parties’ relationship gives rise to 
an inference of implied consent. By contrast, religious institutions seek, at 
times, not simply autonomy over internal decisions regarding its existing 
membership, but also over the very process of accepting members. Thus, for 
example, where candidates apply to serve as the rabbi of an Orthodox
synagogue or priest of a Catholic church, the house of worship or faith 
community may desire to exclude applicants who are women. Such a 
decision, which in principle runs afoul of antidiscrimination law, is largely 
thought to be protected from liability. How should an implied consent 
framework account for such cases given that these cases do not involve 
employees or members, but rather involve applicants who have not as of yet 
consented to the authority of the institution? Is an implied consent 
framework committed to the view that religious institutions should not be 
shielded from liability under relevant antidiscrimination statutes where those 
institutions discriminate in hiring decisions? 
In short, not necessarily. It seems fair to presume that where applicants 
apply for employment opportunities that stand at the center of an 
institution’s religious mission, they implicitly consent to join an inherently 
religious process governed by religious rules. Accordingly, where someone 
applies for the job of rabbi or priest, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
they have implicitly consented to working with the institution through a 
religious process to select and identify a religious leader for the house of
worship. Thus, in some contexts, the mere process of application could 
reasonably be interpreted as providing the necessary, and once again 
implicit, consent to grant the institution the requisite authority and autonomy 
                                                                                                                         
183 See Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, supra note 5, at 541–42 (defining “implied consent” as 
“represent[ing] the voluntary free exercise of religion on the part of many individuals, each granting a 
religious institution authority over internal religious life among the membership in order to promote the 
shared religious objectives”).
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over the collective pursuit of shared religious aspirations such as faith and 
salvation. And as part of that collective pursuit, the applicant would grant 
the institution the authority and autonomy to reject the applicant based upon 
rules necessary to achieve those religious objectives.
By contrast, there are other contexts where the fact that an individual 
stands outside the institution makes it far more unlikely that they have 
impliedly consented to the authority of that institution. As an example, 
consider recent cases of religiously motivated businesses, including cases 
involving a florist, a photographer, and a baker, unwilling to provide their 
services at same-sex wedding ceremonies notwithstanding state laws 
prohibiting businesses open to the public from discriminating on the basis 
of sexual orientation.184
In this context, requesting commercial services from a religiously
motivated business would, without more, seem insufficient to justify an 
inference of implied consent to the religious authority and autonomy of the 
business. Thus, the mere decision of a customer to request to enter a 
commercial transaction would not appear to be a form of joining with the 
business in pursuit of collective religious objectives; in contrast to applying 
to be the leader of a house of worship, the attempt to purchase a commercial 
product does not provide adequate justification to infer that the potential
customer is granting the business the implied consent to make religious rules 
and resolve religious disputes.185
Again, in making this assessment, it is important to keep in mind that in 
such cases the prospective purchaser and shop owner do not consummate an 
agreement over the purchase of services; the point of these cases is that the 
business refuses to sell its services to the same-sex couple. Thus, even in
circumstances where the business viewed its mission, day in and day out, as 
pursuing religious objectives with its customers, and it shared those 
objectives and aspirations with prospective customers, an implied consent 
model would find it difficult to see the prospective customers as having 
joined with the business in the pursuit of those religious objectives. Put 
differently, the implied consent model, which grounds the rights of religious 
institutions in notions of collectivity and membership, would be hard pressed 
to identify those kinds of analogies in cases where businesses reject 
prospective customers on account of a religious commitment that 
necessitates avoiding participation in a same-sex wedding.186
                                                                                                                         
184 See cases cited, supra note 18.
185 While an implied consent framework generally seeks to avoid assessing whether an institution 
or relationship is sufficiently religious—and instead looks at identifying whether there are sufficient 
grounds to justify the existence of implied consent—the distinction between prospective employees and 
prospective consumers does require distinguishing between contexts on the basis of religious content. I 
make this distinction with some reluctance.
186 Berg, who highlighted the notion of notice as a potential mechanism to limit some religious 
accommodations, has suggested that some of my previous arguments of implied consent might be 
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Of course, the fact that a business violating public-accommodations 
laws would not qualify for religious institutional autonomy and authority 
under an implied consent approach need not be the end of the story. Such a 
business might then be eligible for the standard religious liberty protections 
afforded any other individual.187 Thus a sole proprietorship might not, in 
these circumstances, be the kind of institution that can garner the implied 
consent of prospective customers; but that does not mean that the owner 
ceases to stand on the same footing as any other individual who can assert a 
free exercise claim or a claim under RFRA. In that way, there may be 
circumstances where even without the implied consent architecture, store 
owners might simply revert to the status of all other individuals with respect 
to religious liberty claims.
B. The Content of Implied Consent
While the primary question of membership has attracted the most 
attention of implied consent critics, some have worried about a second and 
related problem: How can individuals consent to the rule-making authority 
and autonomy of a religious institution without knowing what rules he or 
she is signing up for? In the words of Hill, “consent is fairly meaningless if 
the consenter is not on notice of the actual terms of the agreement.”188
It is certainly true that entering your standard agreement requires 
certainty over the terms.189 But that does not mean that the very notion of 
consent, whether express or implied, is rendered a nullity where an 
individual grants authority and autonomy over rule-making and dispute 
resolution to some other entity. Indeed, the most natural comparison to the 
implied consent model of religious institutionalism is to arbitration 
                                                                                                                         
extended, by analogy, “to clients’ notice that the organization may have religious norms limiting the 
conduct it is willing to facilitate.” Berg, supra note 6, at 1371. While I would not foreclose this possibility, 
the logic driving my proposed implied consent framework makes that possibility extremely unlikely for 
the reasons described herein.
187 See Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 564–65 n.20 (Wash. 2017) (“The 
attorney general correctly notes that this court has never held that a corporate defendant such as Arlene's 
Flowers has a ‘conscience’ or ‘sentiment’ subject to article I, section 11 protections . . . . But Stutzman 
argues only that she may assert her own free exercise rights on behalf of her corporation . . . . Thus, we 
address only Stutzman’s individual claim that her article I, section 11 rights have been violated. We do 
not address whether Arlene's Flowers (the corporation) has any such rights.”), vacated and remanded 
sub. nom., Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
188 Jessie Hill, Ties That Bind? The Questionable Consent Justification for Hosanna-Tabor, 109 
NW. U. L. REV. 563, 570 (2015).
189 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Even though a 
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a 
contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.”).
918 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:4
agreements190—a comparison that courts have picked up on from time to 
time.191
When it comes to arbitration, parties frequently do not know the content 
or specifics of the rules that will be applied to their case.192 And, moreover, 
the decisions of arbitrators are enforced even when arbitrators make legal 
errors and thereby fail to apply the relevant substantive law in rendering an 
award. Put bluntly, the law does not police the substantive law that 
arbitrators apply in resolving a particular case.193 As a result, parties to an 
arbitration agreement certainly do not know the law that will be applied to 
resolve a dispute.194
Instead, when it comes to arbitration, what parties are guaranteed is not 
substantive safeguards as to the content of the law, but procedural safeguards 
                                                                                                                         
190 I have explored this analogy in depth previously. See Helfand, Arbitration, supra note 148, at 
1944.
191 See Elmora Hebrew Ctr., Inc. v. Fishman, 593 A.2d 725, 731 (N.J. 1991) (“When entering its 
judgment based on the Beth Din’s decision, the Chancery Division drew an analogy between the EHC’s 
submission to the Beth Din’s jurisdiction and common-law arbitration. That analogy is apt, and it is 
reflected in one of the approaches that the United States Supreme Court has suggested for dealing with 
church-property cases presenting religious issues.”); Trs. of E. Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Halvorson, 44 N.W. 663, 665 (Minn. 1890) (holding that the decisions of religious 
institutions are “conclusive” “not because the law recognizes any authority in such bodies to make any 
decision touching civil rights, but because the parties, by their contract, have made the right of property 
to depend on adherence to, or teaching of, the particular doctrines as they may be defined by such 
judicatory. In other words, they have made it the arbiter upon any questions that may arise as to what 
the doctrines are, and as to what is according to them.” (emphasis added)).
192 To be sure, they can contract to have a particular body of law apply to their case. But even there, 
the typical signatory to such an agreement, like the typical member of a religious institution, does not 
know the particulars of the law.
193 See Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 861 (1961) (“[When 
surveyed, e]ighty per cent of the experimental arbitrators thought that they ought to reach their decisions 
within the context of the principles of substantive rules of law, but almost 90 per cent believed that they 
were free to ignore these rules whenever they thought that more just decisions would be reached by so 
doing.”); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration,
83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720–21 (1999) (“In short, the widespread belief among arbitrators that they are 
under no duty to apply the law is consistent with the standard view that many parties choose arbitration 
because it provides a less legalistic process than litigation . . . . In sum, an arbitration award that does 
not apply the law will probably be confirmed by courts.”).
194 For examples of recent federal decisions emphasizing this point, see Rainier DSC 1, L.L.C. v. 
Rainier Capital Mgmt., L.P., 828 F.3d 362, 364 (5th Cir. 2016) (“To constitute misconduct requiring 
vacation of an award, an error in the arbitrator's determination must be one that is not simply an error of 
law, but which so affects the rights of a party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing.” 
(quoting Laws v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 452 F.3d 398, 399 (5th Cir. 2006)); Whitehead v. Pullman 
Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[W]e have long held that for an error to justify vacating 
an arbitration award, it must be ‘not simply an error of law, but [one] which so affects the rights of a 
party that it may be said that he was deprived of a fair hearing.’ We have also spoken of procedural 
irregularities so prejudicial that they result in ‘fundamental unfairness.’”). 
To be sure, some courts still apply the manifest-disregard-of-the-law standard although that is a 
high standard to meet, is rarely invoked and is, in some jurisdictions, in doctrinal retreat. For some 
discussion, see Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 1103, 1144–49 (2009) (discussing whether the manifest-disregard standard survived the Hall Street
decision, noting that there is widespread disagreement).
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ensuring the fairness of the dispute resolution proceedings.195 This 
commitment is captured in the statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration 
award, which focus on procedural unfairness such as partiality, fraud, and 
misconduct.196 As a result, when signing up for arbitration, parties agree not 
necessarily to a particular set of substantive rules, but to a process that must 
be inherently fair if it is to be deemed conclusive and enforceable by civil 
authorities.197
This same framework animates the implied consent model of religious 
institutionalism. Members impliedly consenting to the authority and 
autonomy of a religious institution do so without necessarily knowing what 
rules that institution will make and what methods of dispute resolution it will 
adopt. What those members, however, are guaranteed is that the institution 
will make rules and resolve disputes in ways that will advance the collective 
religious objectives of the membership. And, when the institution adopts 
those religious rules, it will uphold procedural safeguards and enforce those 
rules fairly, without fraud, self-dealing, or misconduct.
Importantly, these procedural safeguards are part and parcel of the 
implied consent framework. Members cede authority and autonomy to an 
institution to the extent that institution develops rules and resolves disputes 
as necessary to pursue collective religious objectives. When religious 
institutions make rules and resolve disputes for institutional gain—or engage 
in fraud or misconduct for the personal windfall of religious leaders—those 
decisions are not granted any degree of legal protection; members have not 
                                                                                                                         
195 See Teamsters Local 312 v. Matlack, Inc., 118 F.3d 985, 996 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming a district 
court decision to vacate a substantive portion of an arbitration award due to procedural errors which 
impeded the defendant’s right to notice and opportunity to be heard).
196 E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012).
197 This is not to say that arbitration itself is immune from criticism; to the contrary, scholars have 
long argued that arbitration doctrine has failed to provide sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure the 
ultimate fairness of the arbitration proceedings. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional 
Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 117 (1992) (“At present, arbitration operates in a culture where, as a matter 
of doctrine, no definite legal norms safeguard constitutional rights.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral 
Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1956 (1996) (“Federal law 
no longer protects the right to engage voluntarily in arbitration, but rather safeguards the right of some 
parties to force other parties into the process.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big 
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33, 63–64 (1997) (“Even in the absence of conclusive empirical studies of arbitration results 
compared to litigation results, one cannot simply disregard the clear perceptions of employers and their 
attorneys, on the one hand, and plaintiff-employees’ attorneys on the other, that arbitration systematically 
favors employers.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 705 (1996) (“If Congress is going to allow 
parties to waive their constitutional rights to a jury trial and a fair process in favor of the more informal 
arbitration process Congress should also ensure that parties receive the functional equivalent of those 
constitutional rights—specifically, notice and a fair hearing.”). While here is not the place to debate 
whether arbitration doctrine has successfully created a method of fair and just private dispute resolution, 
suffice it to say that the implied consent framework adopts arbitration doctrine’s principle of providing 
a fair and just method of dispute regardless of whether arbitration doctrine has been successful in practice. 
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impliedly consented for such deeply distorted rule-making or dispute 
resolution.
This is precisely the standard the Supreme Court used in some of its 
earlier decisions regarding religious institutional autonomy. In these early 
cases, the Supreme Court linked the doctrinal principle of implied consent 
to the need for “marginal civil court review”198 of the internal rule-making 
and dispute resolution within religious institutions. This review, according 
to the Court, would ensure that the decisions of a religious institution were 
not the result of procedural misconduct—or to use the Court’s phrase, the 
decisions of a religious institution would be reviewed for “fraud, collusion 
or arbitrariness.”199 The link between implied consent and marginal civil 
court review made perfect sense; members implicitly consent to a religious 
institution’s internal religious rules and decisions because they are necessary 
to enable the collective pursue shared religious objectives. However, if those 
rules are simply a function of self-dealing and fraud—if they fail to facilitate 
good faith adjudication—then the consent of the membership no longer 
provides a justification for the institution’s rule-making authority.200 In this 
way, the implied consent framework provided a strong and important 
procedural constraint on the authority and autonomy of religious institutions.
The Supreme Court has, for all intents and purposes, abandoned this 
marginal civil court review of religious institutional decision-making. The 
reason largely draws from a fundamental shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, 
moving from an implied consent framework to an adjudicative disability 
framework. Accordingly, and in keeping with much of Lupu and Tuttle’s 
preferred framework, the Supreme Court embraced an approach that deemed 
courts incompetent when it came to resolving disputes that implicated 
religious doctrine.201 And as a result, it discarded the marginal civil court 
                                                                                                                         
198 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969).
199 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
200 See Dennis E. Curtis, Note: Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes—Some 
Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1120 (1965) (“[T]he consent of the members to be 
governed by the church authorities did not envision fraudulent, arbitrary, or collusive action by these 
authorities.”); Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church 
Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1391 (1981) (“Justice Brandeis’ other qualification in Gonzalez—‘in 
the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness’—also seems to follow from the use of contract 
principles. A court should always be available to determine whether an organizational decision has been 
made in the manner contemplated by the agreement, for otherwise the member could not be said to be 
bound by it. Few agreements would contemplate decisions made fraudulently or arbitrarily.”).
201 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (“[T]his is exactly 
the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the 
general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil 
court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”).
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review for fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness as constitutionally prohibited 
under the Establishment Clause.202
From an implied consent perspective, marginal civil court review—such 
as a fraud, collusion, and arbitrariness standard—is necessary to adopt a 
framework geared towards allowing religious institutions the authority and 
autonomy to make religious rules and resolve disputes. Without it, there can 
be no assurance that the processes of rule-making and dispute resolution 
truly comport with the religious aspirations of the membership. Indeed, in 
the years before the Supreme Court turned away from the implied consent 
framework, courts invoked this kind of marginal review of religious 
institutional decision-making, assessing whether decisions failed to abide by 
their own institutional rules.203 An implied consent approach embraces this 
kind of check on the authority and autonomy of religious institutions as it 
ensures that religious authority and autonomy are not used as a mere 
subterfuge to circumvent the legitimate rights of members who have joined 
together to pursue collective and authentic religious objectives.204
Accordingly, religious institutions have the right to promulgate 
rules—and even changes rules—to track theological commitments and 
theological evolution over time. This rule-making authority represents the 
core function of religious institutions under an implied consent framework; 
members join such institutions so that they can adopt, and even revise, rules 
that will promote the shared pursuit of religious objectives. However, the 
promulgation and evolution of internal rules cannot stem from mere attempts 
to manipulate the process of dispute resolution in a particular case. Thus, 
implementing the now-discarded marginal civil court review would require 
judicial assessment of whether an institution has modified rules as an attempt 
to reflect a new theological reality or, instead, to engage in fraud or 
self-dealing. This sort of inquiry surely presents significant adjudicatory 
challenges, but an implied consent approach must simultaneously allow for 
                                                                                                                         
202 See id. (“For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are 
in that sense ‘arbitrary’ must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law 
supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the substantive criteria by which they 
are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question.”). While the Court did not explicitly overrule 
Gonzalez as it pertained to fraud and collusion, it cast significant doubt on their continued constitutional 
viability. See id. (“[W]hether or not there is room for ‘marginal civil court review’ under the narrow 
rubrics of ‘fraud’ or ‘collusion’ when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no 
‘arbitrariness’ exception . . . is consistent with [the religion clauses].”); see also Young v. N. Ill. 
Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court left open the possibility of review for fraud or collusion, but noting the “unlikely 
significance this ‘open issue’ might have in some hypothetical case”).
203 See Helfand, Church Autonomy, supra note 5, at 1943–44 n.247 (2013) (collecting cases from 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries where courts assessed whether the decisions of religious institutions 
deviated from their own internal religious rules).
204 For more on this point, see generally id. at 1942–51, 1957–60 (discussing deference, by courts, 
to religious institutions based on the implied consent of the institution’s members).
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religious institutions to change their rules to reflect theological evolution, 
while still ensuring that rules are not modified in an attempt to manipulate 
the internal process of dispute resolution.205
To be sure, the analogy to arbitration’s process-based focus is not 
perfect. Maybe the most notable difference is that arbitration, while lacking 
in any statutory definition, has been characterized as a method of dispute 
resolution where parties submit a dispute for binding resolution to a “neutral
third party.”206 By contrast, granting autonomy to a religious institution over 
internal matters may amount to placing authority in the hands of the very 
institution whose interests make be implicated when resolving internal 
disputes. Thus, the institution may lack the neutrality that serves, at least in 
theory, as the lynchpin of the arbitration regime.207 But the fact that ceding 
rule-making and dispute resolution authority to religious institutions raises 
the specter of partiality and self-dealing is precisely why marginal civil court 
                                                                                                                         
205 On this point, the distinction between process and substance may have some purchase, but is not 
ultimately dispositive. Procedural changes may be more likely to represent attempts to manipulate the 
resolution of disputes and substantive changes may be more likely to represent evolution of theological 
commitment. At the same time, there is no doubt that the reverse is also quite possible; therefore, courts, 
embracing a marginal civil court review, would ultimately need to review any allegations of changes to 
rules when assessing the internal decisions of religious institutions. For more on the difficulties inherent 
in reviewing the decision-making process of religious institutions, see Michael A. Helfand, The Future 
of Religious Arbitration in the United States: Looking Through a Pluralist Lens, in OXFORD LEGAL 
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Paul Schiff Berman ed. forthcoming 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086833 [https://perma.cc/5BP9-TLJU]; Michael A. Helfand, Between Law 
and Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitration Awards, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 141, 141 
(2015).
206 See, e.g., Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assoc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 872 (Ct. App. 
1996) (quoting Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)).
207 It is worth noting, however, that the purported neutrality of arbitration is itself somewhat 
complicated. For one, many scholars have argued that arbitration suffers from a repeat-player bias, 
demonstrating that the system is itself not neutral. See Helfand, Arbitration, supra note 148, at 3005–06
nn.40–41. To be sure, these conclusions regarding repeat-player bias have themselves been questioned. 
See id. at 3007 nn.46–47.
By contrast, some scholars have even promoted the use, in some circumstances, of “embedded 
neutrals” as arbitrators—even as those arbitrators may have relationships with the parties—because they 
present benefits in their understanding of the social and cultural context of the parties; in so doing, these 
scholars embrace the risk of less neutrality given the potential benefits. See id. at 3033–34 nn.173–75
and accompanying text.
Finally, as a doctrinal matter, the judicial approach to policing certain forms of neutrality has not 
been particularly aggressive. Courts typically do not assess the neutrality of an arbitrator prior to the 
proceedings. But see Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
particular arbitration regime included “so many biased rules” that the arbitration agreement could not be 
enforced). Instead, they wait until after an award has been rendered to review the arbitration for “evident 
partiality”—and even then require evidence of direct bias as opposed to evidence that the proceedings 
were structurally biased against one party as opposed to assessing the presumed neutral standing of an 
arbitrator prior to the proceedings. See, e.g., Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544, 553, 555 (7th Cir. 
1999) (collecting cases on structural bias). This combination of the judicial reluctance to deem an 
arbitration sufficiently biased on the front-end of the proceedings and the relatively high standard for 
review once an award has been rendered does raise questions as to whether arbitration doctrine has the 
tools to satisfactorily police the neutrality of proceedings.
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review is vital to implementing an implied consent framework. Indeed, 
extrapolating from arbitration, an implied consent framework may therefore 
require that marginal civil court review—in its inquiry for fraud, collusion,
or arbitrariness—be even more searching than the standards employed by 
courts when assessing whether to vacate an arbitration award, precisely 
because religious institutions lack some of the neutrality present when 
parties submit a dispute for arbitration to a third-party neutral.
The connection between implied consent and procedural safeguards is 
sometimes missed by critics of implied consent. Hill, for example, has noted 
that “litigated disputes in which religious organizations assert claims of 
religious autonomy often involve situations in which the religious 
organization has refused to follow its own rules,”208 concluding that 
“religious institutionalists generally assume that church autonomy should be 
afforded in these circumstances as well.”209 It is true that theories that view 
religious institutionalism through the prism of sovereignty or adjudicative 
disability are both reluctant to review the decisions of religious institutions 
for deviations from internal church policies: the former because courts 
inherently lack the jurisdiction to police such matters and the latter because 
it would require resolution of religious questions. But such cases are where 
one of the unique features of implied consent institutionalism comes into full 
focus. Individuals surely do not consent—impliedly or otherwise—to the 
manipulation of religious rules and courts; and under an implied consent 
approach, courts ought to be fully authorized to police those boundaries of 
institutional autonomy and authority.210 Members may cede significant 
power to religious institutions to make the substantive rules necessary for 
pursuit of shared religious objectives. But conversely, under an implied 
consent approach, courts also serve as an important check on religious 
institutions, ensuring that fraud, misconduct and self-dealing do not spill into 
the rule-making or dispute resolution process. That kind of conduct is 
precisely the kind of institutional malfeasance that an implied consent 
approach seeks to ferret out by and expose to the scrutiny of civil courts.
C. Existence of Other Compelling Government Interests
As emphasized above,211 an implied consent approach to religious
institutionalism relocates the doctrinal origins of the authority and autonomy 
of religious institutions under the Free Exercise Clause as opposed to the 
Establishment Clause. Under an implied consent framework, this authority 
                                                                                                                         
208 Hill, supra note 6, at 432.
209 Id. at 433.
210 To be sure, such a position does require a significant loosening of the religious question 
doctrine—that is, the view that courts are constitutionally prohibited from resolving disputes that require 
providing answers to inherently religious questions. See generally Helfand, Litigating Religion, supra
note 5, at 494 (attempting to justify that view on doctrinal and policy grounds).
211 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
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and autonomy is a set of affirmative rights ceded to religious institutions by 
the membership so that they can collectively pursue religious objectives and 
aspirations.
The central implication of this distinction is that religious institutional 
authority and autonomy under an implied consent framework must, like any 
other religious liberty right under the Free Exercise Clause, be subjected to 
strict scrutiny. Accordingly, if the assertion of religious institutional 
authority and autonomy threatens a compelling government interest—and 
withholding that institutional autonomy and authority is the least restrictive 
means for advancing the compelling government interest—then the rights of 
a religious institution must capitulate to the compelling government interest.
This is in stark contrast to the adjudicative disability framework of Lupu 
and Tuttle, which highlights the Establishment Clause and sees the authority 
of religious institutions as simply a byproduct of the adjudicative disability 
of civil courts to resolve religious disputes that implicate religious 
doctrine.212 Establishment Clause constraints on governmental authority are 
not subject to strict scrutiny; they are structural constraints on government 
authority.213 Thus, to the extent the claims of religious institutions are 
analyzed under the Establishment Clause, they could not be overcome in 
cases where the attempted government regulation was narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling government interest. And given the wide-range of 
cases where religious institutions might assert their religious liberty, the lack 
of strict scrutiny review might provide a reason to worry.
Of course, this raises another central question for assessing religious 
institutional claims: What should qualify as a compelling government 
interest under the Free Exercise Clause? Qualifying for the category has 
often been perceived as requiring a government interest to clear a relatively 
high threshold. Indeed, in the context of the Equal Protection Clause, the list 
of compelling government interests is typically viewed as quite short,214 and
accordingly strict scrutiny has been described as “strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact.”215 But the fact that few interests are viewed as compelling in the 
                                                                                                                         
212 See id. (discussing Lupu and Tuttle’s theories on the Establishment Clause).
213 Id.
214 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 248 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J., specially 
concurring) (“[S]ince the Court began applying strict scrutiny to review governmental uses of race in 
discriminating between citizens, the number of cases in which the Court has permitted such uses can be 
counted on one hand. The Court has rejected numerous intuitively appealing justifications offered for 
racial discrimination . . . .”). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 795 (2006) (providing empirical 
evidence from judicial decisions that strict scrutiny “is far from the inevitably deadly test”).
215 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on 
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972); see also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he failure of legislative 
action to survive strict scrutiny has led some to wonder whether our review of racial classifications has 
been strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”).
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equal protection context does not necessarily demand a similar reluctance in 
the free exercise context. Under the Equal Protection Clause, one of the 
primary purposes of subjecting racial classifications to strict scrutiny is to 
“to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body 
is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect 
tool.”216 Thus, when a racial classification is employed in a statute or 
regulation, we inquire whether that statute or regulation is seeking to 
advance a compelling government interest. If it isn’t, then we worry that the 
supposed justification for the racial classification is pretextual; using a racial 
classification where no compelling government interest is at stake indicates 
that there may be some sort of invidious discriminatory intent driving the 
statute or regulation under discussion.217
By contrast, the compelling government interest test under the Free 
Exercise Clause has long been conceived of as a balancing of competing 
legitimate claims and values. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the high-water mark for 
religious liberty doctrine, the Supreme Court explained the test as follows: 
“[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served 
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”218
Similarly, in McDaniel v. Paty, the Court referred to the “delicate balancing 
required” when applying the compelling government interest test under free 
exercise analysis219—a characterization that has continued in subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.220
This express focus on interest-balancing fits within a voluntarist 
approach to the claims of religious institutions. Under this approach, 
religious institutions are afforded constitutional protections because they 
embody the voluntary decision of their members to join together to pursue 
collective religious objectives. Their claims represent core and fundamental 
constitutional values that must be jealously safeguarded. But that does not 
mean there aren’t other vital government objectives that also must be given 
significant weight. An implied consent framework embraces a doctrine that 
                                                                                                                         
216 City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
217 It is worth noting that in many cases, courts employ strict scrutiny where there is no invidious 
discriminatory intent to “smoke out,” but instead using the test in order to “justify” the use of a racial 
classification. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436, 441 (1997); Michael A.
Helfand, How the Diversity Rationale Lays the Groundwork for New Discrimination, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 607, 611–12 (2009) [hereinafter Helfand, New Discrimination]. According to some, the use 
of strict scrutiny under such circumstances is a mistake. E.g., Rubenfeld, supra, at 441 (“Offsetting state 
benefits cannot ‘justify’ a law violating an individual’s equal protection rights.”). I have previously 
argued that it is not a mistake, but represents an alternative conception of rights as applied in the equal 
protection context. See Helfand, supra, at 629 n.138. Regardless, this form of applying strict 
scrutiny—in a justificatory more as opposed to an indicator more—is clearly secondary in the equal 
protection context. Id.
218 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added).
219 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 n.8 (1978).
220 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 729 (1986).
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balances competing interests, recognizing that the free exercise claims of 
religious institutions must be considered against the potential interests 
harmed when accommodations are granted.221
In this way, an implied consent framework leverages its free exercise 
origins, providing an important check on the authority and autonomy of 
religious institutions. And that check draws directly on the other values 
conflicting with the rights of religious institutions, ensuring that courts can 
assess and evaluate these competing claims so as to balance the institutional 
needs of faith communities against other claims central to civil society 
generally.
CONCLUSION
Grounding religious institutionalism in implied consent provides a 
workable framework for resolving some of the thorniest conflicts between 
the aspirations of religion and the demands of the law. Implied consent 
draws from a line of Supreme Court cases dating back to the 19th century, 
and leverages the value of voluntarism alongside the human inclination for 
collective religious experience. Together, they provide the doctrinal 
backbone for the core insight of the theory: to presume that individuals who 
join religious institutions do so in order to join a collective in pursuit of 
religious objectives. And, as a corollary, it highlights the need for 
institutions pursuing religious objectives to make internal religious rules and 
resolve internal religious disputes to ensure that the collective can 
successfully pursue those religious objectives.
Using this framework provides not only a theory for why religious 
institutions receive special treatment under the law, but it also provides 
principles to limit the authority and autonomy of religious institutions. Using 
principles of volitional membership and safeguards of strict scrutiny, 
implied consent hopes to provide a way to resolve, however imperfectly, 
some of the persistent tensions between law and religion.
                                                                                                                         
221 Kent Greenawalt, Should the Religion Clauses of the Constitution Be Amended?, 32 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 9, 15, n.25 (1998) (“Because a claimant’s victory in the free exercise exemption cases means 
carving out an exception to laws that are themselves appropriate, the courts have justifiably lowered the 
government’s burden [in satisfying the compelling government interest test].”).
In this way, an implied consent framework accounts for third-party harms as part of the application 
of strict scrutiny. But see Brief for Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al., 
Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Nos.13-354, 13-356, 2014 WL 333891 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2014) 
(arguing that third-party harms should be considered separately under the Establishment Clause);
Fredrick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: 
An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 343, 348–50 (2014) 
(arguing the same).
